Michigan Law Review
Volume 72

Issue 8

1974

Trusts and the Doctrine of Estates
Olin L. Browder Jr.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons

Recommended Citation
Olin L. Browder Jr., Trusts and the Doctrine of Estates, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1507 (1974).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol72/iss8/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

TRUSTS AND THE DOCTRINE OF ESTATES
Olin L. Browder, Jr.

I.

EQUITABLE FEE ESTATES • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

A. More on Doctor v. Hughes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. "Heirs, Devisees and Legatees" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Gift to a Person's "Executors or Administrators" or
to His "Estate" . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Gift to the Estate of a Living Person . . . . . . . . .
2. The Testator's Estate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Immediate Gifts to a Deceased Person's Estate
or to "A or His Estate" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Remainder or Executory Interest to "A or His
Estate" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Gift of Trust Corpus to the "Estate" of an
Income Beneficiary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Filling Gaps That Do Not Exist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E. Drafting Equitable Fee Estates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

II.

CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS INVOLVING GIFTS OF INCOME . .

A.
B.
C.
D.

Gift of Income as Gift of Equitable Fee . . . . . . . .
The Implication of Cross-Remainders for Life . .
Other Gaps in Income Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Income Interest for a Term of Years or Pur Autre
Vie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. Income Interests Held Transmissible . . . . . . . .

E.
F.

2. Cross-Remainders Implied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Class Gifts of Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. "Next Eventual Estate" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gifts upon a Stated-Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Surplus Income and Deficits in Income . . . . . . . . .
I. Trusts for Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[ 1507]

1510
1512
1513
1517
1518
1518
1520
1522
1524
1528
1530

1531
1532
1542
1546
1553
1553
1556
1558
1560
1561
1563
1564

1508

III.

Michigan Law Review

1566
1566

2. Gifts of Income in Stated Amounts •.........
a. Accumulation ........................ .
b. Income legatee entitled ................ .
c. Next eventual estate .................. .
d. To residue or intestate ................ .
G. Annuities

1569
1569
1572

CONCLUSION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

1575

1568

TRUSTS AND THE DOCTRINE OF ESTATES
Olin L. Browder, Jr.•
"doctrine of estates" is the common law system for the classification of divided ownership. Its primary purpose is to differentiate the legal consequences of the variety of concurrent, present,
and future estates, but it also serves to differentiate the dispositive
language required to create or transfer such estates. The doctrine
of estates, therefore, embraces a sizable part of the law of conveyancing, including the large body of doctrine known as rules of construction.
In modern practice the classification and construction of present
and future interests usually occurs with respect to beneficial interests
in trust.1 It has not been sufficiently recognized, however, that dispositions in trust present special problems of classification and construction that do not arise in nontrust dispositions. It is my purpose
to discuss a number of such problems that have not received adequate systematic attention. These problems have their source in the
complexities of dispositive language typically found in trust instruments.
Interests in trusts may involve admixtures of concurrent and successive interests in income and both concurrent and alternative or
supplanting interests in corpus. Interests in trust income may be
given in shares, percentages, stated sums, or a combination of these.
There may be directions to pay corpus in a variety of forms, or to

T
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• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1935, LL.B. 1937, University of
Illinois; S.J.D. 1941, University of Michigan.-Ed.
The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful suggestions of his colleagues, Pro-_
fessors Lawrence Waggoner and Douglas Kahn.
1. The rise of the trust and the ultimate completion of the panoply of future
interests were related consequences of the Statute of Uses. The absorption of the trust
wrenched the doctrine of estates out of its limited role as a regulator of land tenure.
Under the trust concept, the divisions of ownership of personal property assume the
same forms as the estates in land. It was the English chancellor's wisdom that, while
breaking trust enforcement away from the strictures of the common law, cast the
new rights into common law form. We were thus spared tlvo doctrines of estates (or
perhaps four, if we would otherwise have separate interests in land and chattels, as
well as in trust and nontrust). But of course such simplification could not ignore the
role and status of that indispensable intruder, the trustee. It has long been argued
that we need not explain the interests of trust beneficiaries in property terms, because
the trustee is the owner of trust property, whose duty to the trust beneficiaries can be
explained in in personam terms. See G. BoGERr & G. BoGERT, THE LA.w OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 183 (2d ed. 1965); 1 A. Scon-, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 1 (3d ed. 1967). Tradition, however, has always cast the concurrent or successive relations betlveen one beneficiary and another in property terms. How else can one explain the application to
trusts of almost the whole scheme of estates and its attendant rules of construction,
as well as the vulnerability of trust interests to the Rule Against Perpetuities?
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pay parts of corpus at various times or to several persons at different
times. All of this may be further complicated by grants of discretion
to trustees to determine the amounts paid or the persons entitled to
receive income, or to invade corpus at various times or in various
ways for various purposes.
Most substantive trust language takes the form of directions to
trustees to pay income or corpus. Most such directions can be followed by trustees without guidance. It should be obvious, however,
that dispositions of trust income create special construction problems.
It may not be obvious that the conceptual apparatus of ownership,
when applied to beneficial interests in trust, also seems to have produced special problems of construction and drafting that do not
arise out of dispositions not in trust.

I. EQUITABLE FEE ESTATES
Most private trusts are created for either or both of two purposes:
to establish an effective succession of present and future interests in
property in circumstances in which a succession of legal interests
would be impracticable or insecure, and by separating management
from enjoyment and prescribing professional or regulated management, to protect and enhance the enjoyment of property. Many
settlors seek both objectives; where they seek only the first, they
incidentally gain the second.
Following a succession of beneficial interests the ultimate interests will, of course, be in fee simple: a gift of or a direction to pay
the corpus of the trust estate. Under traditional estate concepts,
fee simple interests may be indefeasibly vested, defeasible, or contingent. The most common condition upon a remainder in fee simple
is a condition of survivorship. In fact, it has been urged that such
interests always be made subject to a condition of survivorship, so
as not to allow the beneficiary to die owning property that he has
never enjoyed but upon which his estate might be taxed. 2 Such advice
is now commonly followed, which usually implies a provision for one
or more alternative contingent remaindermen. The alternative interests should all be subject to express conditions precedent, because
of the complexities and drafting pitfalls inherent in giving primary
remainders that are vested subject to restricted or unrestricted conditions of defeasance.
Not all trusts, however, are or should be variations of this pattern. Some settlors seek only the second objective mentioned above,
2. See Halbach, Future Interests: Express and Implied Conditions of Survival, 49
CALIF. L. REv. 431, 465 (1961).
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and do not wish to create any future interests in the trust estate. Thus
a settlor may not wish to give property to a donee outright, preferring that for some period the property be managed for the donee's
benefit. In fact, a settlor may wish to establish such a trust for his own
benefit, creating a beneficial interest only in himself. The most
obvious way to attain such an objective is the total or partial separation of legal and equitable titles, without any division of the equitable
title. The beneficiary is then entitled to the fruits of a trust administration-usually the right to receive income, either as it accrues or
after a period of accumulation-and the corpus upon the termination of the trust. He has interests in both income and corpus. But
since every interest in trust income is an interest in trust corpusperhaps the only interest in corpus consistent with the purposes of
the trust-it is not proper conceptually (and may produce confusion
and unintended consequences) to say that the beneficiary has two
interests, if by this we mean a division into present and future
estates. He has only one estate, the complete beneficial estate, which
can be called an equitable fee simple or its equivalent.8 For convenience this term may be applied to interests that are in fact partly
legal-where, after a time in trust, the property is given to the beneficiary free of trust.
This may seem to be the simplest kind of trust and the easiest
to declare without ambiguity. Such a trust is not uncommon in cases
in which income is to be paid to one or more beneficiaries for a
period of years in gross or until the attainment of a certain age,
with a direction to pay the corpus thereafter to the beneficiary or
beneficiaries. Each beneficiary in effect takes an equitable fee. 4
A variation of this arrangement, however, may produce a classificatory snare for the unwary. Suppose the direction is to pay the income
to a beneficiary and to pay him the corpus if or when he attains a
certain age. If there is no gift over upon his death, it is permissible
to say that he takes an indefeasible fee interest.5 But if it is appropriate to find a condition of survivorship, as where there is a gift
over to others, it still seems proper, despite language that in form
l!. It is common, for tax and other purposes, to distinguish an income interest
from an interest in the corpus, and for such purposes a beneficiary with an equitable
fee simple would be treated as having two interests.
4. It is generally accepted as a constructional preference that a gift of corpus at a
certain age is not subject to a condition of survivorship if the beneficiary is entitled
to the intermediate income. L SIMES &: A. SMITH, Tm: LAw OF FUTURE INTERl!Sl's § 588
(2d ed. 1956). Under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act substantially the same benefit
can be gained without a trust; the minor takes the full legal title. UNIFORM Gnns TO
MINORS Ac:r § 3.
5. Rl!sTATEMENT OF PROl'El!.TY § 258, comment a (1940).
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imposes a condition precedent, to construe the language as creating
a fee interest defeasible on death before the end of the income
period,6 rather than a term of years plus a contingent remainder or
executory interest. The difference in characterization might be crucial in certain circumstances.
Suppose a settlor wishes to give property to A subject to a trust
for A's lifetime, without creating any other beneficial interest. Assume further that the settlor wishes to give the property over to
someone else only if A leaves (or does not leave) issue. Efforts apparently intended to accomplish such objectives are sometimes couched
in ambiguous language, and the resulting construction problems
have led to decisions that may have frustrated the settlor's intent.
The source of such drafting deficiencies is evident. Most trust
instruments direct the payment of income followed by a gift of or
a direction to pay corpus. It is one thing to direct that income be
paid to A for ten years, and that the corpus shall then be paid to A.
But, although it would not be improper, most draftsmen recoil from
a direction to pay income to A for life, and then to pay the corpus
to A upon A's death. As a result, language actually employed to produce what is in effect an equitable fee may leave doubt whether that
was in fact intended. Or the language may so differ from traditional
forms that construction becomes ensnared in conceptual confusion.
Traditional drafting practice and terminology foster the fallacious
assumption that a gift of income and a gift of corpus necessarily create two separate estates, or that a trust measured by a person's lifetime necessarily creates a life estate.

A. More on Doctor v. Hughes

Doctor v. Hughes7 involved the creation of an inter vivos trust
in land with an income interest to the settlor for life and an express
remainder in the settlor's heirs. When Judge Cardozo breathed new
life into the moribund worthier-title doctrine by treating it as a rule
of construction, he tersely explained why the remainder in the set6. In Rust v. Rust, 211 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App.), afjd., 147 Tex. 181, 214 S.W.2d
462 (1948), trust income was to be paid to a testator's daughter until her thirty-fifth
birthday, at which time the corpus was to vest in fee simple in the daughter, Two
alternative classes of beneficiaries were substituted in case the daughter died before
the end of the stated period. These dispositions were sustained under the Rule Against
Perpetuities, the last two on the ground that vesting was postponed only until the
daughter's death. The daughter's interest would have been valid even if construed as
contingent, but the court said that the fee title to the trust estate vested in her at the
testator's death, defeasible upon her death prior to the stated time, In other words,
she took a defeasible equitable fee estate, Cf. Elmore v. Austin, 232 N.C. 13, 59 S.E.2d
205 (1950).
7. 225 N.Y. 805, 122 N.E. 221 (1919).
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tlor's heirs was ·without effect: "No one is heir to the living; and
seldom do the living mean to forego the power of disposition during
life by the direction that upon death there shall be a transfer to their
heirs." 8 The opinion follows the terminology of worthier title by
declaring that since the limitation to the settlor's heirs was without
effect, a reversion in the settlor was created by operation of law. But
since no one other than the settlor had any interest in the land, the
result is more properly described as an equitable fee simple in him.
Perhaps this is the result intended by the settlor. The draftsman
may have been groping for a way to say that th·e property, on the
settlor's death, should still be regarded as belonging to. the settlor.
It is at least plausible that in such circumstances a draftsman will
insert a provision for the settlor's heirs merely because they are the
normal substitute for one who would take if he were alive. It is not
my purpose, however, to offer a further defense of the doctrine of
Doctor v. Hughes. Its unfortunate history in New York is well
known, and demands for its abolition are still in order.9 The irony
of Doctor v. Hughes is that the effort to cast the worthier-title doc•
trine into a more palatable form may have had a contrary effect.
While a limitation to a person's heirs may be stated ambiguously, it
is too straightforward an expression of intent to justify a construction
that, when the heirs mentioned are the settlor's heirs, the words are
to be treated as if they were not used at all. The drafting lesson of
the American doctrine of worthier title, even where it is still in effect,
is that a limitation of a remainder to one's own heirs is not a secure
method to perfect an inter vivos trust for one's sole benefit or to
retain a reversion after creating income interests in others.

B. "Heirs, Devisees and Legatees"
Suppose that the remainder interest in Doctor v. Hughes had
been limited not to the settlor's heirs but to his "heirs, devisees and
legatees." Such language appeared in Estate of Rosecrans,10 in reference to successors of ~\TO named beneficiaries. An inter vivos trust
instrument directed the payment of principal and accumulated income, in sums and at times left to the trustee's discretion, to a named
son and daughter in equal amounts, or, if either was decreased, "to
the heirs, devisees and legatees of such deceased person, subject
8. 225 N.Y. at 313, 122 N.E. at 223.
9. See Hatch v. Riggs Natl. Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Browder, Future
Interest Reform, 35 N.Y.U. LR.Ev. 1255, 1260 (1960); Verrall, The Doctrine of Worthier
Title: A Questionable Rule of Construction, 6 UCLA LR.Ev. 371 (1959).
10. 4 Cal. 3d 34, 480 P.2d 296, 92 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1971).
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to the administration of his or her estate."11 On the termination of
the trust, at a time not mentioned but presumably upon or after
the death of both named beneficiaries, the trust estate was to be
divided and given in the same manner, that is, "to the heirs, devisees,
and legatees" of the son and daughter. Upon the death of the son
the court in a state inheritance tax proceeding held that the son
took no more than ·a power of appointment, and that the exercise
of the power, under the then applicable statute, did not permit the
inclusion of the appointive property as part of the decedent's separate
property for the purpose of the marital exemption.
A limitation in favor of a person's "heirs, devisees and legatees"
is so tersely ambiguous and so alien to normal dispositive terminology that it may suggest a completely inexperienced or confused
draftsman. Perhaps, however, the terseness--and the fact that the
language is a substitute for a gift to the named person himself-suggests instead a simple notion that is lost if one seeks the meaning in
each word separately. The phrase "devisees and legatees,'' standing
alone, is indefinite if the named person is living, and makes the gift
depend on his will, formally expressed. The result, in effect, is a
testamentary power of appointment, and this could have been what
was intended, except for the word "heirs.'' That word, standing beside the others, can hardly be intended to mean that a person's heirs
are to share the property with his legatees and devisees. The more
plausible inference is that his legatees and devisees are to take if
he dies leaving a will, and his heirs are to take if he dies intestate.
The result, in other words, is a gift in default of appointment to the
heirs of the donee of the power. Full classification of all of the beneficial interests under the Rosecrans trust in these terms would produce a special power of appointment in the trustees in favor of the
son and daughter, with a general testamentary power in each of the
latter, upon his or her death during the term of the trust, to designate the objects of the special power, and also to appoint the remainder or executory interests upon the termination of the trust,
with gifts in default of appointment in either event to their respective heirs.
This elaborate analysis may come rather close to casting in
estate terms the meaning of the words "heirs, devisees and legatees.''
Note, however, the further language in Rosecrans that the property
was to be "subject to the administration of his or her estate.'' If the
testator's son or daughter had only a power of appointment, the
11, 4 Cal. 8d at 36, 480 P.2d at 297, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 681,
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property would not be treated as part of the estate of each for purposes of administration. The power analysis thus ignores part of
the language of the will.
A simpler notion emerges from the language of the Rosecrans
trust taken as a whole. Did it not provide for full beneficial ownership, subject to discretion in the trustee about the times and amounts
of payment-that is, an equitable fee estate? One ingredient of
ownership-the power of inter vivos appointment-might have been
lacking, for the three dispositive words all indicated succession at
death. Perhaps it would therefore have affronted the settlor's desire
to permit the legatees to designate their successors inter vivos. On
the other hand, it might well have furthered the settlor's intent to
give a full equitable fee, permitting his children to deal with the
property as their own for tax purposes.
The California tax law has since been changed on the point
involved in Rosecrans,12 so that the power analysis accommodates the
marital exemption as well as the estate analysis. For most purposes,
either analysis will serve, but there are circumstances in which the
minor differ~nces between them are important. The estate analysis
means that the property belongs to the legatee and goes through his
estate upon his death. It also permits disposition inter vivos, unless
the trust is expressly or impliedly spendthrift. The power analysis
is more complicated and thus more conducive to litigation about the
exercise or release of the power. It keeps the property out of the
probate estate of the donee and usually subjects the property to the
donee's creditors only if he exercises the power.13 Although inter
vivos control by the donee is not altogether eliminated, because even
a general testamentary power is releasable,14 in many jurisdictions
the dis positive power of the donee is restricted by virtue· of the rule
measuring the perpetuity period from the time the power is created.15
Where settlors have obviously sought to confer substantially
complete ownership upon one or more trust beneficiaries,' but have
expressed their intention in terse, ambiguous language, courts are
free to choose from among our proliferated dispositive devices the
analysis that comes closest to the settlor's inferred intent. Considerable sophistication is required for such construction, however. General powers of appointment are essentially proprietary interests so
12.
13.
14.
15.

See CAL. REv. & TAX. CoDE § 13696 (West 1963).
L SIMFS &: A. SMITH, supra note 4, §§ 944-45,
Id. § 1054.
Id. § 1275.
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close to mvnership that a question exists about their status as a
separate dispositive device, at least for some purposes. Where dispositive language creates a power only by implication, courts should
not overlook the larger alternative. Not every power of disposition
is a power of appointment. An mvner in fee simple has the largest
power of disposition, but he does not have a power of appointment.
The same may be said for a trust beneficiary who is given both
enjoyment and the power to name his successors.
These analytical alternatives should also be borne in mind where
a settlor creates an inter vivos trust for his own benefit for life, with
a remainder to his heirs, devisees, and legatees. An issue may arise as
to the effect of the worthier title doctrine-or a statute abolishing
it-on this disposition. In Stewart v. Merchants National Ba~k16 the
settlor adopted the unusual expedient of having the trust declared
by his attorney as settlor; but, because only the client's funds were
used, the court declared the client the settlor in fact. The trust was
for the settlor's sole benefit for his life. On his death, any remaining
principal and accumulated income was to be distributed, after payment of expenses and claims against the estate, "as the Last Will and
Testament of the beneficiary may provide, or to the beneficiary's
heirs-at-law in equal shares if beneficiary leaves no valid will."17
Although the settlor had reserved no power to revoke, he petitioned
for revocation. The trial court's denial of the petition-on the
ground that interests of minors and unborn heirs were involvedwas reversed on appeal.
While acknowledging that the worthier-title doctrine had been
abolished by statute,18 the appellate court stated that the statute did
not "require a trust to be construed in such a way as to override the
expressed intent of the maker of such an instrument."19 Yet if an
express gift to the settlor's heirs is construed to create a remainder in
such heirs, it is difficult to see how the statute could override the
settlor's "expressed intent." Although the court did not mention it,
the effort by the testator to cast his attorney in the role of settlor
might be seen as an effort to avoid the statute. Even if the statute
16. 3 Ill App. 3d 337, 278 N.E.2d IO (1972),
17. 3 m. App. &I at 339,278 N.E.2d at 12.
18. Ju.. REv. STAT. ch. 30, § 188 (1969):

Where a deed, will or other instrument purports to create any present or future
interest in real or personal property in the lieirs of the maker of the instrument,
the heirs shall take, by purchase and not by descent, the interest that the
instrument purports to create. The doctrine of worthier title and the rule of the
common law that a grantor cannot create a limitation in favor of his own heirs
are abolished.
19. 3 Ill App. &I at 340, 278 N.E.2d at 18.
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declares a rule of law, which seems doubtful, the settlor's language
expresses an intention similar to that in Rosecrans-that is, to create
an equitable fee in himself. On this view, the limitation to the settlor's heirs is considered only in relation to other directions for
disposition of the property on his death. Since the conclusion that
the settlor intended to create an equitable fee simple in himself does
not require resort to the worthier-title doctrine, it is not precluded
by a statute abolishing that doctrine.
C.

Gift to a Person's "Executors or Administrators"
or to His "Estate"2 0

Suppose that in Rosecrans or Stewart, instead of language about
heirs, devisees, and legatees, the trustees had been directed to give
the property to a beneficiary's "executors or administrators" or to
his "estate."21 Both unlearned and experienced draftsmen have resorted to simple dispositive language of this sort. These expressions
have appeared in a variety of circumstances, with consequent differences in dispositive intent. Although only one of the variants
involves an equitable fee interest in trust, all reflect aspects of a common construction problem. The significance of this problem requires a brief survey of the several variations, culminating in the
one that involves the equitable fee interest.
It should be noted generally that "estate" as a dispositive term
suffers a special vulnerability in the hands of the courts. Some have
held that property cannot be conveyed to an estate because an
estate is not a person or an entity.22 Where the term is not used to
label a property interest under the doctrine of estates, it is a general
reference to one or more things, an aggregate of things, or a fund,
the scope and attributes of which ate indicated by the context. Obviously an effective conveyance requires a grantee. But there is little
excuse for terminating construction at this point if the donor's
intention can be discerned. Fortunately most courts have avoided the
semantic hurdle, but some have not, and others have stumbled unnecessarily in the pursuit of the donor's meaning.
The Internal Revenue Code repeatedly refers to dispositions
to a deceased person's "estate" under Federal Estate and Gift Tax
20. See generally Fox, Estate: A Word To Be Used Cautiously, If at All, 81 HARV.
L. Rlw. 992 (1968); Annot., IO A.L.R.3d 484 (1966). ,
21, The terms "executoIS and administrators" and "estate" are treated here as
synonymous, provided no intention appears to give to a person's executor or administrator beneficially.
., - : l
22. Gardner v. Anderson, 114 Kan. '178, 227 P. 743 (1923), affd. on rehearing, 116
Kan. 431, 227 P. 747 (1924).
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provisions; 23 the Restatement of Property makes a similar reference
in the definition of a general power of appointment; 24 and a similar
reference appears in the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. 25 The framers
of these provisions surely assumed that the term "estate" has a
valid and clear meaning. The cases discussed below, however, cast
grave doubt upon this assumption.26

I. Gift to the Estate of a Living Person
In Cannon v. Ballenger,27 property was "to go back to Emma
Cannon's estate" on a contingency after a life estate. Emma was
alive when the contingency occurred, and the court gave her the
property. While one might argue that Emma was given only a
power of appointment, the court's judgment seems more likely to
effectuate the donor's intent.

2. The Testator's Estate
In a number of cases homemade wills have directed that property,
after the end of prior interests or upon a contingency, return or
revert "to my estate," or the equivalent. Absent such language the
undisposed-of interest would usually pass as a reversion to the testator's heirs. Should the language, therefore, be treated as surplusage,
or does it prescribe a different result? Several courts have held that
the property goes to the testator's heirs.28 In one case that result
was reached because an estate was held not to be a person capable
of taking property,29 and in the others the language was construed as
equivalent to a limitation to the testator's heirs. A possible difference
benveen a remainder in a testator's heirs and a reversion passing by
intestacy, however, is that the former may be construed so as to as23. E.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 674(b)(6), 204l(b)(l), 2056(b)(l)(A), 2503(c)(2),
2514(c), 2523(b)(l); Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2037-l(e), examples (1), (2); 20.2056(e)-2(b)(2)
(1958).
24. REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 320(l)(b) (1940),
25. UNIFORM GIFI'S TO MINORS Acr § 4(d). See also 17 u.s.c. § 24 (1970) (copyright).
26. See Harris, Tax Traps in Administrative Powers, 8 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE &:
TRUST J. 562, 562 (1973) ("In drafting wills and trusts we are drafting primarily for
. revenue agents, not for equity court judges.'),
27. 222 S.C. 39, 71 S.E.2d 513 (1952).
28. Shockley v. Storey, 185 Ga. 790, 196 S.E. 702 (1938); Gardner v. Anderson,
114 Kan. 778, 227 P. 743 (1923), affd, on rehearing, 116 Kan. 431, 227 P. 747 (1924);
Clark v. Payne, 288 Ky. 819, 157 S.W.2d 63 (1941); Reid v. Neal, 182 N.C, 192, 108
S.E. 769 (1921),
29. Gardner v. Anderson, 114 Kan. 778, 227 P. 743 (1923), affd, on rehearing, 116
Kan. 431, 227 P. 747 (1924),
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certain the heirs at a time later than the testator's death.80 Where
a remainder to one's heirs is followed by a residuary clause, for
instance, it has been held that the remainder interest is disposed of
by that clause,81 although in one case that result was precluded by
the restrictive terms of the residuary clause.82 In another case a
residuary trust estate for the benefit of the testator's children and the
children of a deceased child provided that upon the death of either
of the grandchildren without issue, his share should "revert to my
estate." The court held that the testator meant to refer to the residuary trust estate, and that the share should go to the then living trust
beneficiaries.88
Testators have also made outright gifts of all their property,
or residuary dispositions, to their own estates or the equivalent. The
result is the same, whether it is said to be by intestacy84 or by a gift
to the testator's heirs.85
The problem is different where a donor attempts by inter vivos
disposition to create a future interest in his mm estate or in his
executors or administrators. In In re Estate of Bentley86 a life insurance policy was converted by the insured into what the court called
an "annuity trust." Interest on the insurance proceeds was to be
paid to the insured's daughter for life. On her death the proceeds
were to be paid to her children then living, and, if none, "to the
executors, administrators and assigns of Leon A. Bentley" (the insured). Upon the death of the daughter without issue the court held
the proceeds payable to the successors-in-interest of the residuary
legatees under the insured's will. The result seems sound, although
the court's analysis of the interests created is open to question. The
court said that alternative contingent remainders were created, plus
a defeasible reversion in the insured. Upon the death of the daughter,
the alternative remainder in the "testator's representatives" vested,
divesting the reversion. This remainder was said to be an asset of
the insured's estate and subject to the provisions of his will. Signifi30. Clark v. Payne, 288 Ky. 819, 157 S.W.2d 63 (1941).
31. Downing v. Grigsby, 251 m. 568, 96 N.E. 513 (1911); Martin v. Hale, 167 Tenn.
438, 71 S.W.2d 211 (1934).
32. Clark v. Payne, 288 Ky. 819, 157 S.W.2d 63 (1941).
33. Lyman v. Sohier, 266 Mass. 4, 164 N.E. 460 (1929).
84. In Te Estate of Davis, 59 P .2d 547 (Cal. App.), Tevd. on other wounds, 8 Cal.
2d 11, 63 P .2d 827 (1936).
35. In f'e Estate of Weissmann, 137 Misc. 113, 243 N.Y.S. 127 (Sur. Ct. 1930), affd.,
232 App. Div. 698, 247 N.Y.S. 901 (1931). Cf. In Te Estate of Billman, 175 Misc. 334,
24 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Sur. Ct. 1940), affd., 261 App. Div. 957, 27 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1941).
36. 14 Ill. App. 3d 630, 303 N.E.2d 166 (1973).
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cantly, this analysis assumes that the limitation in favor of the insured's personal representatives was in effect a reservation of an
interest in himself. This interpretation seems sound; however, the
interest was properly not a remainder, but a reversion, which, as
the court held, was subject to disposition by his will. The case presented a recurring drafting problem: It was difficult to express the
intention that any interest not given to his daughter and her children
was to be retained by the insured under circumstances in which that
interest could not be enjoyed until after his death.
3. Immediate Gifts to a Deceased Person's Estate or to

"A or His Estate"
Although an immediate gift to the estate of a named person implies that the named person died before the testator, the gift does
not purport to be a gift to a deceased person. It has been held that
such a gift fails, either because no legatee is named37 or because the
testator's intent was not evident.38 One court refused to pass upon
the validity of the disposition, holding merely that the property did
not go to the heirs of the named decedent. 89
In other cases courts have given the property to the executor
of the named decedent to be disposed of according to the terms of
his will.40 This may mean that the gift is to the legatees designated
in the named decedent's will, in which case the property is not to be
treated as part of the decedent's estate for other purposes.41 Such an
analysis can be justified under the statute of wills, if not by the doctrine of incorporation by reference then by the notion that the
deceased person's will constituted an act of independent significance,
or by compliance with the statute of ·wills by both instruments.42
A simpler analysis, however, is possible. In order to carry out
the inferred intention of the testator a court can treat the property
as though it were part of the named decedent's estate at the time
of his death.48 This has the simplicity of a layman's assumption, and
37. In TC Estate of Glass, 164 Cal. 765, 130 P. 868 (1913).
38. In Te Doyle's Estate, 107 Mont. 64, 80 P.2d 374 (1938).
39. Cookman v. Lindsay, 215 Iowa 564, 246 N.W. 268 (1933).
40. Cumming v. Cumming, 219 Ga. 655, 135 S.E.2d 402 (1964); Bottomley v.
:Bottomley, 134 N.J. Eq. 279, 35 A.2d 475 (Ch. 1944); Arnett v. Fairmont Trust Co., 70
W. Va. 296, 73 S.E. 930 (1912).
41. Cumming v. Cumming, 219 Ga. 655, 135 S.W.2d 402 (1964). Cf. :Bottomley v.
Bottomley, 134 N.J. Eq. 279, 35 A.2d 475 (Ch. 1944).
42. I A. Scorr, supra note I, §§ 54.2, .4.
43. In Arnett v. Fairmont Trust Co., 70 W. Va. 296, 73 S.E. 930 (1912), language of
both the opinion of the court and a dissenting justice seems to assume that the property
would be administered in the estate of the named decedent and subject to the claims
of his creditors. See note 44 infra.
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by the use of a fiction escapes other conceptual difficulties, assuming
that a court is not put off by treating a gift to a person's estate as a
figure of speech to serve in place of a named legatee. This analysis
would, however, subject the property to administration as part of
the named decedent's estate.
Either interpretation is consistent with a holding in favor of
the decedent's heirs where he dies intestate. In other words, a gift
to a deceased person's estate may be treated as a gift to his legatees
and devisees if he leaves a will or to his heirs if he dies intestate.
Where he leaves a will, the gift would presumably pass under the
residuary clause.
Similar problems arise where a testator makes an immediate
gift "to A or his estate," "to A if living, or, if not, to his estate,"
or the like. If a named legatee dies before the testator, his gift
will lapse unless a substitute taker is provided in the instrument
or by law. If an alternative gift to A's estate is construed as a gift
to his legatees and devisees (or heirs), substitute takers do exist,
precluding the application of a lapse statute. But if the property is
treated as if it were part of the decedent legatee's estate at the time
of his death, does the gift violate the law on lapsed legacies and devises, or the applicable lapse statute?44 If a gift cannot be made by
·will to a deceased person, can the testator make a disposition that
treats the deceased person as if he had not died? I see no reason in
policy to prevent this result, however it is explained.
In Estate of Brunet45 the testator devised land "to Otto Speckter
or his Estate." Otto died before the testator, and the California court
held that the devise was "to the persons entitled to succeed to
Speckter's estate, namely his heirs or devisees."46 This of course
meant that his devisees would take if he left a will and his heirs
would take if he died intestate. The court recognized the need to
give meaning to dispositive words and to avoid intestacy, declaring
that to a layman, such as this testator, the construction given was
"reasonable and natural."47 Nothing in the opinion suggests -that
the property was to become part of Otto's estate for general purposes
of administration.4s
44. See, e.g., MD. ANN. ConE art. 93, § 4-403 (1957}. This anti-lapse statute directs
that property given a deceased legatee shall go to "those persons, who would have
taken if said legatee had died, testate or intestate, owning the property."
45. 34 Cal. 2d 105,207 P.2d 567 (1949).
46. 34 Cal. 2d at 109, 207 P.2d at 569.
47. 34 Cal. 2d at 109, 207 P.2d at 569.
48. The same result was reached in Leary v. Trust Co., 272 Mass. 1, 171 N.E. 828
(1930), in which a testamentary trust esta~ was to be paid on the death of the life
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This simple and straightforward assessment of dispositive intent
contrasts with the more recent analysis of the Pennsylvania court in
Braman Estate.49 The court seemed incredibly confused, and in
seeking the testator's intent, seemed to thwart it. Ruth and Mary
were sisters. Ruth's will gave her residue to Mary for life and then
to certain charities. Mary's will gave her residue to Ruth "or her
estate." Ruth died first. Helen, the court said, was the sole heir of
both (although Mary must also have been an heir of Ruth). In
giving Mary's property to Helen rather than to the charities named
in Ruth's will, it is not clear whether the court ruled that Helen
took as Mary's heir, meaning that the gift to Ruth's estate was void,
or that Helen took as heir of Ruth, on the ground that the gift to
Ruth's estate was a gift to Ruth's heirs. The court was concerned
primarily with whether Ruth's will could cover after-acquired property, that is, the residue of Mary's estate. The court held that it could
not, since that would be an effort by Ruth to dispose of an expectancy. But the real issue was the effect of the gift in Mary's will to
Ruth's estate. If this were construed, as in Brunet, to be a gift to
Ruth's residuary legatee, it would not constitute a disposition by
Ruth. The court failed to discover any intention that Mary's assets
be disposed of according to the terms of Ruth's will, about which
Mary may have had no knowledge. But it was just such an intention
that the court in Brunet said was only "reasonable and natural." Is
this indeed not an obvious inference of intent--especially the intent
of a lay draftsman-when property is given to a deceased person's
estate rather than to his heirs?
4. Remainder or Executory Interest to "A or His Estate"

The use of the term "estate" in this context may be designed to
avoid federal estate tax liability ·with respect to an irrevocable inter
vivos transfer. 6° Provided that A is living when the instrument takes
effect, an analysis can be made similar to that in the Rosecrans case. li1
beneficiary to the testator's brother "James if he be then living and in event of his
death to his, said James' estate." James died in the testator's lifetime. The property
was held to pass by the residuary provisions of James's will. The court said the result
was not explained by incorporation by reference, since James's will was not in
existence when the testator's will was made. Rather, the testator had made "the
remainder a part of James' estate, James having the right to dispose of the remainder
as a part of his estate as he wished." 272 Mass. at 7, 171 N.E. at 830. It is clear
from the decree that the property was not to be subject to any further administration
of James's estate, but was to be paid directly to James's successors in accordance with
the terms of his will
49. 435 Pa. 573, 258 A.2d 492 (1969).
50. See Treas, Reg. § 20.2037-I(e) (1958).
51. See text accompanying notes IO-II supra.
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If the language means the same as a limitation "to A if living, if not,

to his estate," it can be construed as giving A a contingent remainder plus a general testamentary power to appoint an alternative
remainder, with a further alternative remainder in default of appointment to A's heirs.
Again, however, such a complicated analysis is not necessary.
This dispositive language may simply be a layman's way of making
clear that a legatee is to have an indefeasibly vested remainder. A is
to take the property if living; if not, it is to pass through his estate.
The traditional dogma against implying conditions of survivorship
may not be well understood by inexperienced draftsmen, and they
may be reluctant to direct a trustee to pay corpus to a person who
may not be living when the direction applies. The proposed construction, however, may startle a court steeped in traditional dispositive terminology, for it amounts to saying that language purporting to impose a condition of survivorship was really intended to
have the opposite effect.
Preposterous results can be reached with language of this sort
when construction is hidebound by traditional dispositive forms and
concepts. In Ryan v. Beshk52 the testator devised land to his wife,
provided she did not remarry. Upon her death or remarriage he gave
the land to four named collateral relatives, with the provision that
"if they be living at the death or remarriage of my wife, or in the
event of the death of all or any of said persons . . . I give or bequeath his or her part or share intended for him or her who has died
before the death or remarriage of my said wife ... to his or her executor or administrator to be applied by such as if the same had
formed part of the estate of such person ... at his or her decease.''58
Two of the named persons died in the wife's lifetime, and the court
held that their shares passed by the residuary clause of the will to
the testator's ·widow. The court declared that the language of the
will clearly imposed conditions precedent of survivorship. The alternative remainders to the remaindermen's executors or administrators were found subject to the condition precedent that such
officers be duly appointed, which might occur beyond the perpetuity
period. The remainders to the officers were therefore held void.
Apparently no one argued the possible construction of a power
of appointment in the named legatees, exercisable upon death before
the end of the wife's life estate. Counsel did argue, however, that the
remaindermen's interests were vested, and that allowance should
52. 339 Ill. 45, 170 N.E. 699 (1930).
53. 339 Ill. at 46, 170 N.E. at 700.
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be made for the ignorance or carelessness of the testator in not correctly expressing his intentions. This was too much for the court
to swallow, immersed as it was in the technicalities of vesting. Although the court said it must seek intention from the language of
the will, and not from inferences about what was in the testator's
mind, this hardly justified ignoring the language directing payment
to a legatee's executor or administrator.
All draftsmen should understand that a remainder is vested except as language makes it contingent, and that the best way to limit
a vested remainder is not by language that appears to make it contingent. Judicial construction, however, requires more than a mechanical application of the technicalities of vesting. Courts should
be aware that not all words of apparent condition are intended to
impose conditions, especially where the validity as well as the meaning of a testator's dispositions is at stake.

5. Gift of Trust Corpus to the "Estate"
of an Income Beneficiary
This final context for a gift to a person's estate or to his executor
or administrator presents essentially the same problem as that discussed in Rosecrans.154 The use of the term "estate" in this setting
may be designed to avoid federal gift tax liability with respect to
gifts to minors 55 or, by use of the so-called "estate trust,"116 to gain
the benefit of the marital deduction under the federal estate or gift
tax laws. Putting the disposition most simply, suppose property is
given in trust to pay the income to A for life, and on A's death, the
corpus is given to A's estate (or A's executor or administrator). As
discussed in connection with Rosecrans,111 either of two constructions
may substantially preserve the settlor's purpose. It can be said on
the one hand that A takes a life interest plus a general testamentary
power of appointment, with a gift in default of appointment to his
heirs. It can be said more simply that A takes an equitable fee simple.
The risk most to be feared in the use of such language is not that a
court will fail to recognize one or the other of the two alternatives,
but rather that a court will become enmeshed in conceptual confusion over such unfamiliar language and subvert the whole scheme.
The follo'wing cases represent the range of possibilities.
54. See text accompanying notes 10-11 supra.
55. See INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 250ll(c).
56. See INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 2056(b)(l), 252ll(b). See also Fox, supra note 20,
at lO0ll.
57. See text accompanying notes 10-15 supra.
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In Rogers v. Walton 68 the residue of the testatrix's estate was
given to her children in trust to operate the testatrix's business and
to pay the net income equally among the children. Upon the death
of any child the estate was to be managed by the survivors in the same
manner, until the death of all but the last survivor, who was directed
to distribute the "proceeds of this trust to the devisees under this
Will, ... to their estates, and to himself equally." In a suit for construction by the executrix of a deceased son of the testatrix, the court
properly held that during the trust the personal representative of the
deceased son was entitled to the son's share of the income, and at the
termination of the trust was entitled to his share of the corpus. After
rejecting the argument that a bequest to a person's estate is necessarily void, the court said: ''We think that the intent of the testatrix
is clear to give to each son a one-third interest in the trust fund,
which could pass as his property under his will or as intestate property if he should leave no will." 69
In Second National Bank v. Dallman60 the insured under a life
insurance policy had elected an optional settlement under which his
daughter was to receive a life annuity of three per cent upon the
principal, together ·with the right to designate a contingent beneficiary of the principal; if no contingent beneficiary were living at her
death, the sum held by the insurer was to be paid to the beneficiary's
executors, administrators, or assigns. The beneficiary died without
designating a contingent beneficiary, but leaving a will that gave
all of her residue in trust. Her executor paid the insurance proceeds
to her designated trustee. A federal estate tax was paid on this sum
under protest, and a judgment denying recovery was reversed.
This contractual arrangement is obviously analogous to a disposition in trust. The beneficiary's contract right against the insurer was
a chose in action that, if transferable, was a property interest. The
real question was what property, if any, she owned at her death. The
government offered the two alternative analyses of the effect of directions to pay to a person's executor or administrator discussed
above: an equitable fee in the "insurance proceeds" or a general
power to appoint them.
The court held that she had neither,61 stating that the contract
gave the beneficiary only the right to name a contingent beneficiary,
58. 141 Me. 91, 39 A.2d 409 (1944). -· _ . _
59. 141 Me. at 99, 39 A.2d at 412.
60. 209 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1954).
61. Was not the power to name a contingent beneficiary a general power of
appointment? If so, it would have been a pre-1942 power that was not exercised. See
INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 204l(a)(l).
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a right that expired on her death. The disposition of the insurance
proceeds was thus governed by the terms of the contract, which gave
them to the decedent's executor. The court expressed no thought
as to whether the executor was under any obligation in disposing of
them. Yet any such obligation, if it existed, could be explained only
in property terms. While the express provision permitting the beneficiary to name a contingent beneficiary is admittedly somewhat
inconsistent with an intention to confer a larger power, the direction
to pay to the beneficiary's executors, administrators, or assigns
must mean that the proceeds, at the beneficiary's death, were to be
treated as if they belonged to her or were subject to disposition by
her will.
The result and rationale of Dallman were criticized and rejected
in Keeter v. United States. 62 There an insurance settlement option
provided that the beneficiary was to receive interest on her principal
share for life and that on her death the principal was to be paid to
her executors and administrators. The court held that the beneficiary
had a general testamentary power of appointment over the insurance
proceeds, which made them subject to tax in her estate, stating: "We
know of no state in which the executor is empowered to do whatever
he chooses with a decedent's estate.'' 63 The court did not, however,
consider the possibility that the beneficiary had more than a power
of appointment.
Language directing the payment of trust corpus to a deceased
person's estate or to his executor or administrator may give rise to
an additional complication. In re Clark64 concerned a will that
gave one half of a decedent's residue to trustees
to collect the income thereof and pay over semi-annually to Emory
Wendell Clark, during his life, and upon his death to pay over the
principal to his executors and administrators, provided he leave a
child or children, not adopted, living at the time of his death, but
in case he should die without leaving any child or children of his
own, not adopted, to pay over the principal of said part, share and
share alike, to Vassar College . • • to Williams College . . • and to
Teachers College ... ,60

In a suit for construction by Emory, the surrogate held that,
upon Emory's death leaving children, the principal was payable to
his executor if he left a will or to his administrator if he left no will,
62.
63.
64.
65.

461 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1972).
461 F.2d at 719.
274 App. Div. 49, 80 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1948).
274 App. Div. at 50, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
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to be administered in either case as if the principal had been owned
by him at the time of his death. On appeal this decree was modified
to provide that on Emory's death leaving a child not adopted the
trustees should pay the principal to such person or persons as he
might by will appoint and, in default of appointment, to such persons as would be entitled to take his estate in the event of intestacy.
While the surrogate's decree could be interpreted to mean that
Emory took an equitable fee, defeasible on his death without leaving
children, the appellate division interpreted the decree to give Emory
a vested remainder in the principal from which he was to receive
income for life. The court was troubled by the irregularity of the
latter analysis and quoted the following language from an early case
in the court of appeals:
Undoubtedly a testator, without violating any rule of law, could give
an estate to trustees, ·with directions to collect the income and pay
it over to a beneficiary, and, upon the death of the latter, the trust
estate to sink into, and become part of, the estate of the beneficiary,
but so far as we know, no will, which, in express· terms, has so disposed the property, has been brought to the attention of the courts;
and the fact that such a provision is very unusual does not aid
us in coming to the conclusion that such a disposition was intended
by the testator.6 6
The court also said that "[a] future estate is rarely created in one
in whom it can vest in possession only during the future life." 67
"Since it was not the intention of the testatrix to give to her nephew
the principal of this trust after he shall have died," 68 the directions
of the will conferred upon him a power to appoint by will the persons who would take as beneficiaries of the testatrix. The court's
key assumption was that a direction to pay income necessarily creates
a life estate. The resultant confusion disappears if the language,
taken altogether, is seen as giving an estate not limited to Emory's
life but defeasible on his death without children surviving.
The court also said that "it was not the purpose of decedent
herein thus to impose upon her nephew the burdens without the
advantages of ownership of the principal of this large fund." 69 The
burdens were those to which any decedent's estate is subject, but
what benefits would Emory lack except those powers given to the
trustees to be exercised for his sole benefit? The court rejected the
66. 274 App. Div. at 51, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 4, quoting Howland v. Clendenin, 134 N.Y.
305, 310, 31 N.E. 977,979 (1892).
67. 274 App. Div. at 51, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
68. 274 App. Div. at 52, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
69. 274 App. Div. at 51, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
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argument that, since Emory was to have his power only if he died
leaving children, the power was to appoint only among his children
-a special power. Such a construction, it stated, improperly makes
"a condition of the existence of the power" serve "as a limitation
upon its scope." 70
Fortunately, the court's judgment was not subverted by its analytical misconceptions; the objectives of this testatrix. were substantially vindicated.11 General testamentary powers of appointment,
however, are essentially spendthrift devices, conferring substantial
ownership upon a trust beneficiary to whom a life interest is also
given while denying him the power to alienate or encumber his
interest during his lifetime. It might be wise not to make the power
analysis of dispositive language of this sort a constructional preference, since in effect it creates a spendthrift device by implication.

D. Filling Gaps That Do Not Exist
The error of construction that the court avoided in Clarkconstruing a condition that the beneficiary leave issue as an expression of intent to benefit the issue-was made with such a vengeance
in Bredin v. Wilmington Trust Co.72 that the beneficiary was left
without any power of disposition. A trust agreement entered into
by Irenee du Pont provided for the payment of the trust income to
the settlor's eight named children. Each child was to receive one
eighth of the net income upon attaining the age of twenty-one.
Further:
In the event of the death of any one of the said children leaving
issue, her proportionate part of the corpus or principal of the said
trust estate shall be paid to the executor or administrator of the
child so dying, free and discharged from any trusts. If, however, any
one of the said children shall die leaving no issue her surviving,
her share of the corpus or principal shall be held by the said Fidelity
Trust Company for the survivors and held and disposed of as herein
provided.73

There were alternative gifts over on the death of all eight children
without leaving issue.
It can be assumed that this dispositive instrument was neither
homemade nor prepared by inexperienced counsel. The language
70. 274 App. Div. at 54, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
71. Emory did receive a bonus, whether intended or not, in that this property was
not subject to his debts except to the limited extent brought about by his exercise of
the power.
72, 42 Del. Ch. 563, 216 A.2d 685 (1965).
73. 42 Del. Ch. at 565, 216 A.2d at 686.
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quoted above was carefully designed to make a complete disposition
of all beneficial interests. Nevertheless, the court held that upon the
death of a daughter leaving issue there was an implied future interest
in favor of such issue.
While the implication of future interests to fill dispositive gaps
has become a well-recognized principle of construction, great care
is required in its application. Before a future interest can be implied,
a dispositive gap must be found. When courts begin to fill dispositive gaps in the guise of construction, they may fill gaps that do not
exist.74

Here the court relied upon an old rule that a gift to A for life,
with a remainder to B if A dies without issue, justifies the implication of a remainder in A's issue. The error in using that rule here
was the same as that made in Clark75-the assumption that the income interests in the settlor's children were life interests. The court
said that to give a life interest plus a vested remainder to the same
person would be "an oddity in the field of wills and trusts," 76 so
that such an intent could not be imputed to the settlor. However,
the settlor might have intended, and probably did intend, simply
to give interests that were greater than life interests but defeasible
on death without issue.
Having found an intention to benefit the issue of a deceased
beneficiary, no room was left to construe the language referring to
the executor or administrator of a deceased child as conferring a
power of appointment upon such child. But the court came tantalizingly close to the mark when it conceded that it might hold
differently if, in addition to the language used, the settlor had added
that the property should "become part of the Estate of the one so
dying." 77
•
74. See Warner v. Warner, 237 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The court found no
dispositive gap, despite arguments of counsel seeking the implication of future
interests. For recent cases in which courts filled gaps that arguably did not exist see
In Te Thall, 18 N.Y.2d 186, 273 N.Y.S.2d 33, 219 N.E.2d 397 (1966), discussed at text
accompanying notes 189-93 infra; In Te Englis, 2 N.Y.2d 395, 161 N.Y.S.2d 39, 141
N.E.2d 556 (1957).
75. See text accompanying notes 64-69 supra.
76. 42 Del. Ch. at 566,216 A.2d at 687.
77. 42 Del. Ch. at 566, 216 A.2d at 687. Cf. Colonial Bank &: Trust Co. v. Stevens,
164 Conn. 31, 316 A.2d 768 (1972), in which a testator gave 400 dollars per year until
the corpus and accumulations were exhausted. The interest of any legatee who died
during the trust was given to his children, or, if none, it was to remain part of the
trust and be distributed to the testator's surviving children. Upon proof that for a
period of years the income was more than- sufficient to pay the annuities, the court
held that upon the death of the last surviving child of the testator, the trust estate
not then distributed should be held as the intestate property of the testator. The
result means that the interests of the children were only life interests.
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E. Drafting Equitable Fee Estates
One who works his way through the discouraging record of litigation sketched above may be convinced that many American courts
cannot conceive of separating legal and equitable interests by means
of a trust without also dividing the equitable interests into present
and future interests. One might suppose that, like a gift to "A and
his heirs," a gift in trust for "A absolutely" would be the simplest
and most obvious provision for the professional management of
property. If one were to try this, however, he would probably learn
that the trust was "dry" and no trust at all. Or, even if a direction
to manage the propery and pay income were implied, a question
would arise about the duration of the trust and whether (or when)
the beneficiary could terminate it. If express directions to pay income for the beneficiary's lifetime were included, they would need
to be explicit that the beneficiary's life was the measure of the
duration of the trust, and not the measure of the beneficiary's interest.
It could be argued that if a settlor indeed wants to give interests
in trust that are defeasible on death with (or without) issue but are
otherwise unlimited, he should begin by giving the property to one
or more beneficiaries, and then add that for the period of each
beneficiary's lifetime his share of the corpus shall be held in trust
for him, with a gift over on his death with (or without) issue. This
will usually work, 78 but it requires careful drafting. 70
If a settlor wishes to create a trust solely for A's benefit, with
income to be paid to A for his lifetime, perhaps the only safe advice
is not to do it at all, but rather to use a similar arrangement with
which the courts are familiar: Give A an interest for life plus a general testamentary power of appointment, with a gift in default to
A's heirs. The power device, however, produces its own risks and
special consequences, not all of which may be acceptable. It also
does not serve well a settlor who wishes to use the so-called "estate
trust" as a method of qualifying for the marital deduction under
the federal estate or gift tax. 80
78. See cases cited note 85 infra.
79. In Howland v. Clendenin, 134 N.Y. 305, 31 N.E. 977 (1892), a residuary gift was
made to the testator's named children "and to their respective heirs, executors, ad•
ministrators and assigns forever," subject to trusts thereinafter declared. These trusts
constituted the executors as trustees of shares given in trust for the daughters, to
pay them the income, "and upon their death, as each shall happen to die, to pay over
and distribute the principal of the share or portion of the one so dying, to her issue
living at the time of her decease." The testator's purposes on the death of his
daughters might have been expressed more clearly; but the court held that the
daughters took life estates only, and on the death of a daughter without issue her
share of the corpus passed as the intestate property of the testator.
80. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2056(b)(l), 2523(b). See also Fox. supra note 20,
at 1003-04.
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Despite the constructional risks involved, experienced draftsmen
have resorted to the simple expedient of directing that income be
paid to A for life, with a direction to pay the corpus to A's estate
on his death. This sort of disposition remains attractive apart from
tax consequences, not only because of its simplicity, but because
of the difficulty of expressing such an intention in other words.
Some draftsmen will no doubt continue to assume the risks of such
language, perhaps in part because they are not aware of them. Others
may elaborate the language so as to leave no doubt about the consequences intended.81
I believe that the time has come to convert this technically inartful expression-gift to an "estate"-into a term of art, meaning what
many draftsmen assume it already means. A gift to a deceased person's estate would constitute a direction that the property be treated
as if it were owned by the decedent at the time of his death. It would
serve as a simple expression of intention that would otherwise require an elaborate paragraph to express without ambiguity. While
this can best be accomplished by enlightened judicial construction,
it can be accomplished by legislation if necessary.
II.

CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS INVOLVING GIFTS OF INCOME

Most of the familiar problems involved in trust administration
require for their solution the use of the income-principal correlatives. The problems may require definition of both income and
principal, determination of when a right to income accrues, apportionment of income between successive interests, classification as
income or principal of corporate distributions and certain other
special forms of property, and assessment of the respective charges
against income and principal that must be satisfied during a trust
administration. It is significant that, unlike the new Louisiana Trust
Code,82 which differentiates between "income" and "principal" beneficiaries, the Uniform Principal and Income Act uses the terms
"income beneficiary" and "remainderman."83 This suggests the continued relevance of traditional estate terminology, which suffices for
the purposes of the Act, despite the fact that not every beneficiary of
principal is a remainderman.
The problems considered under this section are of a different
sort. They involve ambiguity respecting either the identification of
81. See Fox, supra note 20, at 1013-14. Life insurance contracts commonly contain
a standard provision that if the insured does not name a beneficiary, the proceeds shall
be paid to his estate. As we have seen, such language may also appear in optional
settlement provisions.
82. LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN.§§ 9:1721-2252 (1964).
83. UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND lNcOME Ac:r § 1.
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the beneficiaries of income or the duration of their interests. The
ambiguity may result in gaps in the scheme for distribution of income, and the resultant problems can be characterized in terms of
doubt on the part of a trustee about what he is to do with income
from a trust fund. In general the problems are of two kinds. The
first is analogous to the difficulty created by gaps in the disposition
of corpus under a scheme of concurrent, successive, or alternative
interests, and includes the prior question whether a limitation in
fact creates a dispositive gap. The second is peculiar to income gifts
and usually arises from a surplus, or occasionally from a deficiency,
in the income available for distribution.
A source of error in courts' treatment of the equitable fee problem discussed above was the difficulty in applying the present-future
estate correlatives to successive interests in trust income and principal. The same difficulty is encountered in the income problems
discussed below.

A. Gift of Income as Gift of Equitable Fee
A survey of the problems involved in the creation of equitable
fee interests in trust must include cases in which a trustee is directed
to pay income to one or more persons without an express limitation
in time, and with no direction for the payment of corpus. Such a
disposition seldom occurs in so simple a form. A direction to pay
income is frequently accompanied by a power to invade corpus for
stated purposes or to make up a sum that is given in the form of
an annuity, but without further gift of corpus. Corpus may in fact
be given upon some but not all possible contingencies, and circumstances occur for which no disposition of corpus is provided. Such
cases pose squarely the possible confusion bet\veen the life estateremainder correlatives of the doctrine of estates and the incomeprincipal correlatives of prevailing trust practice.
The first notion that must be avoided is that the two sets of
correlatives are coterminous. A gift of trust income is not necessarily
a life interest. While this proposition is axiomatic, it leaves unresolved the troublesome question whether, under the construction
of particular language in the light of relevant circumstances, a gift of
income is intended to be limited for life.84
84. Contrast the effort to establish in Louisiana a trust code that would gain
the benefits of the common law trust in a civil law jurisdiction in which the doctrine
of estates had never been accepted. See text accompanying note 82 supra. A central
feature of the system is the simple classification of trust beneficiaries as "income" or
"principal" beneficiaries, which of course does not prevent any person from being a
beneficiary of both. LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:1805-07 (1964). The Code provides that
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Within the common law scheme of fragmented ownership a gift
of any beneficial interest in trust is a gift of a benefit to be derived
from, and is therefore an interest in, the corpus of the trust. It is
the purpose of every private trust to withhold from the beneficiaries
the control of the corpus for a time, while conferring all other
benefits of the corpus throughout the life of the trust. The quantum
or duration of any beneficial interest in trust is governed, not by the
kind of enjoyment conferred, but by the usual tenets of conveyancing and construction applicable to nontrust conveyances.
Dispositive provisions that merely direct the payment of trust
income should be distinguished from those that purport to give
property to a beneficiary but are accompanied by language sufficient
to create a trust of such property and by directions to pay income to
the beneficiary.85 Although the latter may fail to indicate the duration of the trust, there should be no doubt that the intention is to
give the full beneficial title, either by way of an equitable fee or a
limited equitable interest accompanied by a successive legal fee. As
already suggested,86 such a provision, when properly drafted, may be
an effective way of giving an equitable fee subject to a trust for the
beneficiary's lifetime, because it avoids the drafting obstacle encountered in telling the trustee to pay the corpus to the beneficiary
on his death. But the distinction between the two kinds of dispositions is sometimes not easy to draw, as in the case of a disposition
to a trustee "for the benefit of A" followed by directions as to income
on1y.s1
Where income is given with no express gift of corpus, prevailing
dispositive practices may create pressures to find an intention to give
only a life interest, even though it is conceded that an income interest
is not conceptually or by definition a life interest. A court may be
tempted to infer that if no limit to an income interest is stated,
the omission was inadvertent. The result may be partial intestacy;
the interest of a principal beneficiary vests on his death in his heirs or legatees. LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:1972 (1964). While there may be successive income beneficiaries,
LA. REv. STAT, ANN. § 9:1807 (1964), the interest of an income beneficiary ends at his
death. LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 9:1964 (1964). See Oppenheim, A New Trust Code for
Louisiana-Some Steps Toward Its Achievement, 37 TUL. L. REv. 169, 182 (1963).
An income interest is apparently regarded as in the nature of a usufruct, like a life
estate in land, which constitutes a burden upon, but does not divide, ownership.
85. E.g., In re Ternansky's Estate, 4 Ohio Op. 2d 329, 141 N.E.2d 189 (Ct. App.
1957); Williams v. Thompson, 375 S.W.2d 489 (I'ex. Civ. App. 1964); In re Suhling's
Will, 258 Wis. 215, 45 N.W.2d 608 (1951).
86. See text preceding note 78 supra.
87. E.g., Gourley v. Greene, 102 N.H. 501, 161 A.2d 172 (1960). Cf. In re Work
Family Trust, 260 Iowa 898, 151 N.W.2d 490 (196'1).
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or, to avoid intestacy, a court may imply a future interest in persons
other than the income beneficiary.
In the absence of language or circumstances justifying the inference that only a life interest was granted, however, the court may
properly invoke the precept of conveyancing that an interest is absolute or in fee simple unless an intent to limit is expressed. Where
there is no express gift of corpus, the presumption against intestacy
may in many instances fortify a construction that an equitable fee
has been given. 88 Since all draftsmen understand how to create life
interests and gifts of corpus, the failure to do either is presumably
intentional. It may reflect the difficulties in drafting a disposition
intended to vest property in a beneficiary while withholding control
during his lifetime or for some other period. The only inadvertent
omission may be an express limitation on the duration of the trust.
In fact there is substantial authority for a rule of construction that
an unlimited gift of income with no gift of corpus is a gift of the
full equitable ownership, or an equitable fee. 89 Such a result is often
reached, however, only after a court has considered relevant circumstances and discovered no contrary intent. It is clear that this rule
does not distinguish between an immediate gift of income and one
limited as a remainder after a prior limited gift of income. 00 The
existence of a prior, expressly limited income interest reinforces
the inference that the succeeding interest is absolute.
The rule has been applied to gifts of income with a power in the
trustee to invade corpus in his complete discretion or when necessary to provide support. 91 Where corpus is mentioned for the purpose of permitting its invasion, one might infer that no further
interest in it was intended. Another inference is possible, however:
88. See, e.g., Citizens Fidelity Dank&: Trust Co. v. Schellberg, 238 S.W.2d 142, 144
(Ky. 1951).
89. See, e.g., Wilmington Trust Co. v. Houlehan, 15 Del. Ch. 84, 131 A. 529 (1925);
Stephens v. First Natl. Dank, 222 Ga. 423, 150 S.E.2d 865 (1966); In re Work Family
Trust, 260 Iowa 898, 151 N.W.2d 490 (1967); Goetz v. Goetz, 174 Kan. 30, 254 P,2d 822
(1953); Citizens Fidelity Dank &: Trust Co. v. Schellberg, 238 S.W.2d 142 (Ky. 1951);
Dixon v. Dixon, 123 Me. 470, 124 A. 198 (1924); In re Trust of Tufford, 275 Minn. 66,
145 N.W.2d 59 (1966); Gourley v. Greene, 102 N.H. 501, 161 A.2d 172 (1960); Kale v.
Forrest, 278 N.C. 1, 178 S.E.2d 622 (1971); Lowitz Estate, 360 Pa. 91, 61 A.2d 342 (1948);
Simmons v. Morgan, 25 R.I. 212, 55 A. 522 (1903); Trammell v. Trammell, 162 Tenn,
1, 32 S.W.2d 1025 (1930).
90. Arnold v. Barber, 472 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1971); Gourley v. Greene, 102 N.H. 501,
161 A.2d 172 (1960); In re deVarona's Trust, 274 App. Div. 303, 84 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1948),
afjd., 299 N.Y. 726, 87 N.E.2d 450 (1949); Simmons v. Morgan, 25 R.I. 212, 55 A. 522
(1903); Ross v. Stiff, 47 Tenn. App. 355, 338 S.W.2d (1960).
91. In re Work Family Trust, 260 Iowa 898, 151 N.W.2d 490 (1967); Citizens
Fidelity Dank&: Trust Co. v. Schellberg, 238 S.W.2d 142 (Ky. 1951); In re Will of Cuff,
277 App. Div. 829, 97 N.Y.S.2d 182 (1950); In re Will of Edwards, 199 Misc. 58, 97
N.Y.S.2d 3 (Sur. Ct. 1950).
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The testator may merely have wanted to keep the corpus out of the
beneficiary's hands. The corpus has been held to pass by the beneficiary's will or as her intestate property where in addition to a gift
of income and a power to invade corpus for support the trustee was
authorized to deliver the entire corpus to the beneficiary in its uncontrolled discretion.92
The rule has similarly been applied to gifts of periodic payments
of a stated sum out of income and corpus, or out of income with
resort to corpus if the income is insufficient.93 In one such case the
will prohibited the trustee from paying amounts greater than a
stated sum to two named beneficiaries, but he was authorized to
terminate the trust when in his discretion continuance of the trust
was neither justifiable nor practicable under the circumstances. The
beneficiaries unsuccessfully sought termination. Unless terminated
by the trustee, the court stated, the trust would end on the death
of the survivor of the beneficiaries, when "the remainder would go in
equal shares to the estate of each beneficiary." 94
•
The Massachusetts court has often refused to accept the rule declaring an equitable fee, absent dispositive language indicating an
intention to give such an interest to the income beneficiary. The
result in such cases is a life interest in the beneficiary,95 and in most
instances an intestacy of the corpus. In the most recent expression
of the court, however, an intention to give the entire beneficial interest was inferred from a consideration of the dispositive scheme,
despite the absence of specific language to that effect.96
It has been held by lower courts in New York that the equitable
fee rule does not apply where a will creating a trust and giving only
income also contains a residuary clause.97 This holding incorrectly
assumes that the only basis for the rule is the presumption against
intestacy, and, perhaps for this reason, ii: has not been universally
followed in New York.98
The nature and source of the rule under discussion are often
stated with terse ambiguity. Some courts have relied upon an old
rule that a conveyance of the rents and profits of land is a conveyance
92. Stephens v. First Natl. Bank, 222 Ga. 423, 150 S.E.2d 865 (1966).
93. In re Trust of Tufford, 275 Minn. 66, 145· N.W.2d 59 (1966); In re Estate of
Klarsfeld, 13 Misc. 2d 353, 175 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Sur. Ct. 1958).
94. In re Trust of Tufford, 275 Minn. 66, 74, 145 N.W.2d 59, 65-66 (1966).
95. Compare Hull v. Adams, 286 Mass. 329, 190 N.E. 510 (1934), and Keating v.
Smith, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 232 (1849), with Chauncey v. Salisbury, 181 Mass. 516, 63
N.E. 914 (1902), and Holden v. Blaney, 119 Mass. 421 (1876).
96. Goodwin v. New England Trust Co., 321 Mass. 502, 73 N.E.2d 890 (1947).
97. In re Estate of Tubbs, 196 Misc. 914, 9 N.Y,S.2d 222 (Sur. Ct. 1939).
98. See In re Will of Edwards, 199 Misc. 58, 97 N.Y.S.2d 3 (Sur. Ct. 1950).

1536

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. '12:1507

of the land itself.99 That precept says nothing about the duration of
the estate conveyed, and courts applying it to nontrust dispositions
have readily discovered an intent to create only a life estate.100 It
seems obviously designed for nontrust dispositions, and it may be
misleading to apply it to trusts. An unlimited right to trust income
may properly create an equitable fee, but not an immediate right
to trust corpus, nor a right to receive income in perpetuity. The
result, in other words, should be the same as if the trust corpus had
been given to the beneficiary subject to its being held in trust to
pay him the income. The beneficiary is entitled to receive the corpus
only upon a proper termination of the trust. Nevertheless, some
courts have declared that an unlimited gift of income is a gift of
corpus, with the result that the beneficiary takes outright and free
of trust,101 or that he has an immediate right to have the corpus
from the trustee.102 Upon finding that an active trust was created,
other courts have rejected the rule by concluding that the beneficiary
took only a life interest.103 The only alternatives were assumed to
be either a legal fee or an equitable life estate. Further distortion
appears where, on the same assumption, courts have declared a legal
interest on the ground that where the only duty expressly given to
a trustee is to pay income, the trust is "dry."104
The difference between a legal and an equitable fee is of small
importance in cases in which the only question is whether a beneficiary has the legal title in fee (or is presently entitled to have it
conveyed to him). "While the procedural situation in some cases does
not require an answer,105 this is a normal question of trust duration
or of the right of a beneficiary to have a trust terminated. Since
there is no express language relating to the duration of the trust
99. COKE ON Lrrrr.ETON, L. I, c. 1, § I, ,r 4b (19th ed. C. Butler 1932).
100. E.g., Morrison v. Schorr, 197 Ill. 554, 64 N.E. 545 (1902): Reed v. Reed, 9 Mass.
372 (1812).
101. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Houlehan, 15 Del. Ch. 84, 131 A. 529 (1925); Arnold
v. Barber, 472 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1971); Passman v. Guarantee Trust&: Safe Deposit Co.,
57 N.J. Eq. 273, 41 A. 953 (Ch. 1898); Ross v. Stiff, 47 Tenn. App. 355, 338 S.W.2d 244
(1960). In re Estate of Klarsfeld, 13 Misc. 2d 353, 1'16 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Sur. Ct. 1958), is
the most recent of a series of New York lower court rulings that seem to have decreed
legal estates. The court relied on Hatch v. Bassett, 52 N.Y. 359 (1873). Cf. Citizens
Fidelity Dank &: Trust Co. v. Schellberg, 238 S.W.2d 142 (Ky. 1951).
102. Gourley v. Greene, 102 N.H. 501, 161 A.2d 172 (1960).
103. Skovborg v. Smith, 8 N.J. Super. 424, 72 A.2d 9II (Ch. 1950); Dell v. Harrison,
498 P.2d 397 (Ore. App. 1972). See also cases cited note 95 supra.
104. Citizens Fidelity Dank &: Trust Co. v. Schellberg, 238 S.W.2d 142 (Ky. 1951);
Wilkins v. Miltimore, 95 N.H. 17, 56 A.2d 535 (1948); Carmany Estate, 357 Pa. 296, 53
A.2d 731 (1947).
105. Stephens v. First Natl. Dank, 222 Ga. 423, 150 S-.E.2d 865 (1966); Goetz v.
Goetz, 174 Kan. 20, 254 P.2d 822 (1953).
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in many cases, the duration must be inferred from other language,
if any, and from relevant circumstances.
Most of these difficulties, or at least most of the judicial confusion,
are not encountered in England, where the Statute of Uses has been
repealed and there is no doctrine of dry trusts. A trust without
stated duties in the trustee is a "simple trust," 106 but it continues
until the trustee conveys to the beneficiary. The absence of any
problem of trust duration in England derives from the ability of a
single trust beneficiary who is sui juris and who has a vested interest
to compel payment to him of the principal, free of the trust. The
American Clafiin doctrine107 prevents termination of a trust upon
the motion of a single beneficiary, or the concurrence of all multiple
beneficiaries, so long as any stated or inferred objective of the trust
remains unfulfilled.
Under the Claflin doctrine the duration of a trust should not be
decided simply on the ground that a gift of income without limit
in time is a gift of corpus, or by straining the doctrine of dry or
passive trusts. It is equally objectionable to say, as some courts have
at least implied,1°8 that an unlimited gift of trust income gives a
legal fee because otherwise the trust would be perpetual and therefore void. Unless otherwise provided by statute, a private trust is not
void merely because its duration is unlimited.109 A trust that may
last beyond the limits of the Rule Against Perpetuities stands beyond
the protection of the Claflin doctrine, which simply means that the
English rule is applicable and the trust may be terminated by the
beneficiary or beneficiaries.110 Thus a trust to pay the income "to A
and his heirs forever" should not be void, but should continue so
long as A or his successors in interest wish to enjoy its benefits or
protection.
·
American settlors, of course, usually do not create such trusts
intentionally; nor is it likely that a settlor who directs merely the
payment of income to a beneficiary intends a trust that is immediately terminable. There is an alternative to holding that the beneficiary takes either an equitable life estate or the legal fee, for particular dispositive language and circumstances can surely imply that
although such a beneficiary takes the equitable fee, the trust lasts
106. LEWIN ON TRUSTS 6 (16th ed. w. Mowbray 1964).
107. See Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889).
108. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Houlehan, 15 Del. Ch. 84, 131 A. 529 (1925); Dixon
v. Dixon, 123 Me. 470, 124 A. 198 (1924).
109. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 1, § 218.
110. L. SIMES &: A. SMITH, supra note 4, § 1393.
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only for his life,111 or during his minority,112 or otherwise as the
circumstances suggest.113
Such a result could properly be based on a finding that the purpose of the trust has been accomplished at the beneficiary's death
or upon his majority. If the question arises upon the death of the
income beneficiary, it is easy to infer that no purpose of the trust
would be served by continuing the trust after his death. None of
these considerations, of course, is inconsistent with a finding, on
particular language or circumstances, that the beneficiary was intended to take no more than an equitable life estate.114
No court has had more difficulty with this problem than the
Pennsylvania court. That court's strugglesm follow from a failure
to distinguish between nvo issues: whether the income beneficiary
takes a life interest or a fee, and whether his interest is legal or
equitable. The Pennsylvania court apparently assumes that the applicable rule of construction produces a legal estate in fee; but when
an active trust is created, the notion that an unlimited gift of income
creates a fee estate must be wholly rejected. As a relief against the
strictures of its position, the court has strained to find that a trust
is dry where the trustee has been directed merely to pay income.
The nature of the court's dilemma is best expressed in its own words.
In a case in which the residue of a testator's estate was given in trust,
and part of the income was to be paid to the testator's daughter,
"her heirs and assigns," the court denied the relief sought by those
who claimed the daughter was given only a life estate, stating: "[H]ad
the testator intended to create an active trust to be measured by the
life of the daughter, he would have evidenced such intentions by
the use of the words 'for life,' rather than by words of inheritance."11°
111. In re Trust of Tufford, 275 Minn. 66, 145 N.W.2d 59 (1966). Income was given
to two beneficiaries and the trust was held to last until the death of the survivor of

them.
112. In re Will of Hedden, 8 Misc. 2d 1012, 169 N.Y.S.2d 64 (Sur. Ct. 1957), revd.
mem., 'l App. Div. 2d 764, 179 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1958). The court found no provision in
the will for the payment of income in excess of that given to the beneficiary, and so
found that it was to be accumulated. Under the old New York accumulations rule,
accumulation of income beyond the minority of the beneficiary was illegal. The court
thus declared that the trust terminated when the beneficiary attained her majority,
but that she was then entitled to receive the fund in question.
113. In re Work Family Trust, 260 Iowa 898, 151 N.W.2d 490 (1967): Citizens
Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Schellberg, 238 S.W.2d 142 (Ky. 1951); In re Trust of
Tufford, 275 Minn. 66, 145 N.W.2d 59 (1966). In Citizens Fidelity Bank b Trust Co.
the court also declared the trust dry, It is easy to confuse the doctrine of dry trusts with
the Claflin doctrine.
114. E.g., Burton v. King, 459 S.W.2d 663 (I'ex. Civ. App. 1970),
115. See Annot., 174 A.L.R. 319, 363 (1948).
116. Carmany Estate, 357 Pa. 296, 299, 53 A.2d 731, 733 (1947). This case was later
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The problem of unJimited gifts of income assumes a somewhat
different aspect where the disposition includes a gift of corpus only
under specific circumstances, and either different circumstances have
occurred, or the gift of corpus is invalid. This means, of course, that
the. gift of income, although not without express limitation, is unlimited in the circumstances in which the case has arisen. In such
cases other precepts fortify the construction that the income beneficiary is left with an equitable fee.
The first of these situations has most often arisen where income
is given to the testator's widow with a gift over of corpus in the
event of her remarriage. This has been held to create an equitable
fee that is defeasible upon marriage, but that passes as the widow's
property on her death unmarried.117 The fact that the settlor has
chosen to divest her interest on one event implies that her interest
is not terminable on any other event. A more extreme example
appeared in a recent case in which income was given to the testator's
wife and the children of his stepson in equal shares, but with the
provision that in case of the death of the widow or any of the children the income should be divided "between" the survivors. The
last survivor of the widow and children sought payment of the corpus, which was granted.118 The court inferred that the testator could
not have intend~d to benefit his next of kin upon the death of all
the beneficiaries, since the persons who qualified as next of kin were
all much older than his stepson's children. The trust was terminated
without discussion, apparently on the assumption that termination
was implicit in the ruling about the estates created. Further consideration of the duration of the trust might well have produced
the same result, for on these facts it may be inferred that the continuance of the trust would serve no purpose of the testator.
Industrial National Bank v. Votaw 119 presents a situation analogous to the disposition of income to a widow with a gift of corpus
relied on to give a trust fund outright to a testator's sisters, although the will directed
that the fund be administered by a trustee and that the earnings be divided equally
among the sisters. Lowitz Estate, 360 Pa. 91, 61 A.2d 342 (1948). The decision in Carmany seems justified, although three justices dissented on the basis that the sisters
should have received only life interests. It is also arguable that the decision in Lowitz
was justified. But if the ground for terminating the trust was the want of any indication of a purpose for its continuance, one might take exception to the ease with
which the court jumped to that conclusion.

117. Jennings v. Reed, 75 N.J. Eq. 530, 72 A. 939 (Prerog. 1909), Telying on
Traphagen v. Levy, 45 N.J. Eq. 448, 18 A. 222 (Ch. 1889). In Jennings the gift was to
the widow of the testator's brother; a prior income interest was given to the brother
for life.
118. Gourley v. Greene, 102 N.H. 501, 161 A.2d 172 (1960).
119. 104 R.I. 404, 244 A.2d 575 (1968).
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on her remarriage. The will contained elaborate dispositive arrangements, obviously drafted professionally, but nonetheless imperfectly.
Upon the death of the testator's widow the income of a trust was
directed to be paid to two daughters in equal shares, "and in case
of the decease of either of them leaving issue living at the time of
such decease then such issue shall take his, her, or their parents'
share of such income.''120 Other provisions for income and corpus
were made in case of the death of either or both of the daughters
without issue, but there was no language directing the payment of
corpus on the event that actually occurred: the death of both daughters, each leaving one daughter. Each of these granddaughters was
paid half the income until, on the death of one, the trustee sought
construction. The court held that each of the grandchildren acquired
a vested equitable fee, and that each of them could have demanded
payment of her share upon the death of her mother.
The court followed a tortuous route to this result, however. Ignoring the language that limited income to the issue of the daughters,
the court said that the testator failed to provide for the disposition
of the trust estate upon the death of the daughters leaving issue.
Accepting the principle of the implication of future interests from
a dispositive scheme, the court implied vested remainders in the issue
of the two daughters, and then labored to the conclusion that such
remainders were in fee simple. The dispositive language limiting
remainders in the income to the issue of the daughters, however, did
not specify the duration of such interests. If the language had been
construed to create equitable remainders in fee there would have
been no dispositive gaps to be filled by implication.
The court summarily disposed of the question of the trust's
duration. The court said that the fee interest in the granddaughters
was equitable. The decision must mean that upon the death of each
of the testator's daughters the purpose of the trust of her share was
fulfilled, and that, the gifts to issue were limited to issue living at
each daughter's death. If the gifts of income to issue were given the
broadest meaning, a perpetuity violation would have resulted.
The court in Votaw cited as authority Ross v. Stiff, 121 which presented the income rule-unlimited gifts of income carry the feein a perpetuity setting. With some simplification, trust income in
Ross was to be paid to the testator's widow, two daughters, and a
granddaughter, with the widow's share apportioned among the
others on her death. The testator· directed that his estate be kept
120. 104 R.I. at 410, 244 .A.2d at 580.
121. 47 Tenn. App. 355, 338 S.W.2d 244 (1960).
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intact so long as his ·wife, children, and grandchildren should live.
If none of his issue were living at the death of his wife and his last
living grandchild, the corpus was given to two persons, or, if they
were not then living, to their children. In a suit by the executors
for construction, the court held that the r~mainders created at the
end of the trust violated the Rule Against Perpetuities. This left the
income interests unlimited in duration. Applying a traditional rule
of construction, the court said that the prior interests became what
they would have been if the future interests had been omitted.122
Since the prior income interests were without limitation, they carried
the fee. The court ruled that upon the widow's death the trust estate
would vest in possession and enjoyment in the other income beneficiaries, that is, the trust would end on her death.
The court refused to speculate about the complex possibility of
implied limitations of income if the stated income interests were
treated as life interests. It simply assumed that the stated income
interests were in effect interests in fee entitling the legatees to the
corpus. However, it was not necessary that the trust be terminated
at the death of the testator's widow. Although the testator's intention
respecting the duration of the trust was necessarily frustrated, under
the Claflin doctrine that intention might have been preserved at
least to the extent of continuing the trust as to each legatee's share
until her death. That is, the fact that the legatees' interests were
not life interests did not mean that the trust should not continue
for their respective lives.
In sum, an intentional unlimited gift of income has proven to be
the most successful device for creating an absolute or defeasible
equitable interest in corpus. It is, however, not a satisfactory method.
The draftsman should at least accompany such a direction with dispositive language expressing an intention to give more than a life
interest, but an interest subject to the trust provisions regarding the
payment of income.123
If a failure to make a gift of corpus is inadvertent, the equitable
fee rule may frustrate the testator's intent. It hardly needs to be
emphasized, however, that if one wants to limit an interest for life,
even an income interest, he should say so in the usual manner. When ·
such simple and familiar words are absent, it is hardly justifiable,
except in the most compelling factual circumstances, for a court to
·write them in. Where a gift of corpus is included, but not in the cir0

122. The court cited J. GRAY, THE RULE AGA1Nsr PERPEI'UITIES § 247 (4th ed. R.
Gray 1942).
123. See text accompanying notes 78, 86 supra.
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cum.stances that have occurred, it seems even less permissible for a
court to infer that the income interest was meant to be only £or life.
Such an inference will produce a dispositive gap if there is no applicable residuary clause, and this may in tum lead a court to believe
that it must imply a future interest in the corpus.
B.

The Implication of Cross-Remainders for Life

The oldest rule of construction for implying future interests to
fill dispositive gaps applies where property is given to persons as
tenants in common for life (or in tail), with a remainder in fee to
take effect only upon the death of the last surviving life tenant. The
rule prescribes the implication of cross-remainders for life in the life
tenants, so that on the death of one life tenant, a remainder for life
takes effect in possession or enjoyment in the survivors or survivor. 124
While this rule was not particularly so designed, it is most commonly
applied to trust dispositions in which a trustee is directed to pay
income. There are cases, however, in which the rule has not been
mentioned, with the result that the income is not disposed of and
so passes by a residuary clause or by intestacy.120
The reasons for the rule are seldom mentioned. Presumably,
since the gap arising in such cases is unlikely to have been intended
by the donor, the result reached is a natural inference of donative
intent, which also avoids partial intestacy.
The main difficulty in applying the cross-remainder rule is the
observance of its proper limits. It is obvious that there is no need
for such a rule if the life interests are given in joint tenancy, which
produces the same result without special construction. The modern
presumption against joint tenancies furnishes the principal impetus
for the implication rule.
'
No dispositive gap is created if the remainder in fee is not limited
over on the death of the last living tenant but takes effect in shares
upon the death of each of them. However, the intention to limit the
remainder upon the death of all of the life beneficiaries is seldom
expressed so clearly as to leave no doubt. In Kiesling v. White,1 26
after the limitation of income interests so as "to give my said brothers
and sisters a life estate only in my said property," the will gave to the
testator's nephews and nieces "share and share alike, the rest and
124. REsrATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 115 (1936); L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 4,
843; Annot., 140 A.L.R. 841 (1942),
125. L. SIM'.ES & A. SMITH, supra note 4, § 843. See Union & New Haven Trust Co,
v. Sellick, 128 Conn. 566, 24 A.2d 485 (1942).
126, 411 Ill. 493, 104 N.E.2d 291 (1952).
§

August 1974]

Doctrine of Estates

1543

residue of all of my property after the life estates hereinabove provided ... have come to an end."127 The court rejected the argument
that the words meant "after the respective life estates are ended"
and implied cross-remainders. In support of this conclusion the court
relied on the words "share and share alike," which might be violated
if the remainder accrued in segments since the remainder was
limited to a class subject to increase.128
The cross-remainder rule is particularly well illustrated by New
Jersey Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Ellsworth,129 which involved
two sets of similar dispositions in the same will. One gave the interest upon 5,000 dollars of a trust estate to two nephews and two
nieces "for and during the term of each of their natural life [sic],
and upon the decease of the last one of my nephews or nieces," the
sum was to become part of the residue. Upon the death of one of
the nephews, his share of the income was held to pass to the surviving
nephew and nieces. This result was not spoken of as the implication
of cross-remainders, but in terms of joint tenancy. The residue was
also to be held in trust, the income from which was given to three
other nephews in equal shares "for and during the term of their
127. 411 m. at 495, 104 N.E.2d at 292.
128. But see In re Browne's Will Trusts, [1915] I Ch. 690, in which trust income
was to be paid to such of six nieces as were living at the end of two life interests,
for their respective lives. A further direction ordered the trustee "after the decease of
my said six nieces, to stand possessed of my said trust estate and the income thereof,
upon trust for and to such child or children of my said son as shall be living at his
decease • • • ." [1915] 1 Ch. at 691. Three of the six nieces survived the life interests,
and construction was sought as to the effect of the death of one of them. Conceding
that several constructions were possible, the court held "that on the death of each
niece the ultimate gift to the remainderman takes effect in respect to her share." [1915]
1 Ch. at 693. The court regarded the language limiting the remainder as ambiguous,
and believed that to construe the language to read "after the decease of my six nieces,
respectively" was "the more probable construction." [1915] 1 Ch. at 695. This construction was thought to be suggested by the language giving the income to the nieces for
their respective lives. For a case to similar effect see Michigan Trust Co. v. Young, 34'7
Mich. '78, '78 N.W.2d 581 (1956). Cf. Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives &: Granting
Annuities v. Riley, 89 N.J. Eq. 252, 104 A. 225 (Ch. 1918).
Hunt v. Mitchell, 409 m. 321, 99 N.E.2d 347 (1951), did not involve a trust, but a
devise of a described portion of land to a daughter for life, with the remaining portion to a son for life. On the death of the two children or either of them, both parcels
were given to the testator's grandchildren living at the death of the survivor of the
two children. The son died leaving two children, survived by his sister. The court
spoke of the cross-remainder doctrine and seemed undeterred by the fact that the life
tenants took separate parcels rather than as tenants in common. But the court did
not believe that the implication of a remainder for life in the daughter was consistent
with the testator's intention. The court believed that the illogical condition of survivorship, which seemed to direct that the remainders take effect separately, but on a
condition that would be appropriate only if they took effect simultaneously, did not
express the true intention. The language about grandchildren living at the death of
the "survivor" of the tlvo children was construed so as to substitute "either" for
"survivor." With this construction there was no gap.
129. 108 N.J. Eq. 229, 154 A. 602 (Ch. 1931).
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natural life [sic], and upon the decease of my said nephews to pay
over [the balance of the estate] to such child or children of my said
nephews ... as shall be living at that time, in equal shares." Emphasizing the contrast between the two clauses, the court held that
upon the death of one of these nephews one third of the corpus
vested in his children then living.
A serious error in the application of the cross-remainder doctrine
results from ignoring the requirement that the initial interests be
life interests (or interests in fee tail, which of course are rarely encountered today). If they are not life interests, no gap is created by
the death of one of the takers. If the interests are all limited for a
term of years, or for the life of a named person (that is, pur autre vie,
rather than for the respective lives of each of the takers), with remainders at the end of such periods, a taker's interest does not by
its terms end upon his death before the end of the stated period.
Some courts, however, have failed to heed this analysis and have
implied cross-remainders in such situations.180 Such a result means
either that the court is implying a limitation of life interests, which
in particular circumstances may have some support as a matter of
construction, or is applying the cross-remainder doctrine in ignorance
of its proper dimensions, which is more objectionable. This constructional obfuscation is given black-letter status by section 143(2)
of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts: I£ trust "income is payable
to two or more beneficiaries and the principal is payable to another
on the death of the survivor of the income beneficiaries, and one of
them dies, the survivor or survivors are entitled to the income until
the death of the last survivor, unless the testator manifested a different intent."131 While this language does not reach the case in
which the corpus is given at the end of a term of years or upon
the death of any person other than the survivor of the income beneficiaries, it erroneously includes the case in which the income beneficiaries' interests are limited not to their respective lives but pur
autre vie for the life of the survivor. In the latter case there is no
130. This problem is discussed further in the text following note 172 infra.
131. This provision contrasts with R.EsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 115 (1936), which
provides:
When an otherwise effective conveyance creates concurrent estates for life held
as a tenancy in common, and also creates a future estate limited to take effect
on the death of the survivor of the expressly designated life tenants, then, in
the absence of a manifestation of an inconsistent intent, such conveyance also
creates in favor of each such life tenant a remainder estate for life in the share
of each other such life tenant, which remainder takes effect in possession only
if the first life tenant outlives the life tenant as to whose share such remainder
estate is created.
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gap to be filled; to this extent the stated rule is an extension of the
cross-remainder doctrine and rests on dubious and limited case authority. The result may be defensible in particular circumstances,
but not as a constructional preference.
Dispositions in trust present a number of dispositive patterns
that raise questions regarding the applicability of the cross-remainder
doctrine. Dispositions usually direct the payment of income to persons in equal shares. This is hardly a disposition to persons as tenants
in common (unless one means merely that the takers have no inherent right of survivorship), but if the doctrine were held inapplicable in such cases, it would scarcely ever apply to dispositions in
trust. Suppose, however, that income is given for life in shares of one
quarter to A, one quarter to B, and one half to C, with a gift of
corpus on the death of all three to the issue of C. Does the doctrine
apply if A dies first? Does it apply if C dies first? If so, how is the
share of the decedent to be apportioned?

In Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Swan Point Cemetery132
income was to be divided equally among four named beneficiaries.
On the d~ath of each his part was to "be reversed back to the estate,"
and on the death of the survivor the "full amount" was given to a
college. The court held that this language gave life interests and required that on the death of each beneficiary, one fourth of the
income be accumulated for the benefit of the college. This answered
the claim that remainders for life be implied, but as a further ground
for decision the court distinguished a prior case133 in which two
beneficiaries had been given income for life with a gift of corpus to
a library "at their deaths." The court there did not speak of the
implication of remainders, holding instead that the beneficiaries took
as joint tenants, which of course produced the same result.134 The
ground for distinction was that "undivided income" had been given
in the earlier case, while in the later case the income was divided
into four shares, indicating that each beneficiary was to receive no
more than a quarter of the income.135
132, 62 R.I. 83, 3 A.2d 236 (1938), affd. on rehearing, 63 R.I. 79, 7 A.2d 205 (1939).
133. In re Monroe, 42 R.I. 412, 108 A. 497 (1920).
134. But see In re Browne's Will Trust, [1915] 1 Ch. 690, discussed in note 128

supra.
135. Suppose that quarter interests in income are given to A and B for their
respective lives, and the "balance" of the income is given to the children of C. A dies
first. In Stanley v. Stanley, 108 Conn. 100, 142 A. 851 (1928), the court seemed to
believe that the obvious result was to give A's income to the children of C. If that
is what is meant by giving the "balance" to them, it amounts to an express gift of a
remainder in the income, leaving no gap to be filled.
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Other Gaps in Income lnterests136
In Butler v. Butler131 the residue of an estate was left in trust to
pay three fifths of the income to the testator's wife for life and two
fifths to his daughter for life. On the wife's death, and when a son
of the testator reached the age of twenty-eight, the corpus was to go
to the daughter and the testator's three sons, with alternative gifts
over of the daughter's share if she were not then living. When the
testator's wife died before the son reached twenty-eight the income
previously paid to the ·wife was held payable to the primary remaindermen (the daughter and sons). Obviously these dispositive
provisions, stated in terms of explicit fractions, differ from those in
the traditional statement of the cross-remainder doctrine.188 The
court discussed only the nature of the remainder, on the assumption
that if it were vested, even defeasibly, it would include income not
otherwise given. The court refused to order the accumulation of income for the benefit of the remaindermen, on the usual ground that
nothing in the will indicated such an intention.
The same result was reached in Aldrich v. Aldrich189 on similar
facts, except that the corpus was given at the end of the income period
to such of the testator's children as were then living, the lawful issue
then living of a deceased child to take the child's share. The court
subverted the normal import of this language by finding that the
remainder was not contingent, but vested subject to defeasance. It
awarded the undisposed-of income to the remaindermen.
In Glaser v. Chicago Title b Trust Co.140 half of certain income
was given to a daughter for life and half to a son for life. On the death
of either leaving issue, half of the corpus was to go to his or her
surviving issue per stirpes. On the death of the survivor the corpus of
the survivor's share was to go to his or her surviving issue, with a
provision giving all of the corpus to the issue of one if the other died
·without issue. When the son died without issue in the lifetime of
C.

136. Several of the cases discussed under this head might have been included under
the discussion of the cross-remainder doctrine in section IIB supra. They are con•
sidered separately, however, partly because they present variations in dispositive
language that raise a question about the scope of that doctrine, and partly because
only one of the courts even mentioned the doctrine as providing a possible construe•
tion.
137. 40 R.I. 425, 101 A. 115 (1917).
138. Because the income interests were given in fractions, the court's analysis in
a later case, Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Swan Point Cemetery, 62 R.I. 83, 3
A.2d 236 (1938), would have prevented application of the cross-remainder doctrine, See
text accompanying notes 132-35 supra.
139. 43 R.I. 179, 110 A. 626 (1920).
140. 393 Ill. 447, 66 N.E.2d 410 (1946).
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the daughter, the court held that the income previously paid to him
should be distributed as intestate property of the testator. The next
of kin were determined as of the testator's death, so that half went
to the daughter and half through the son's estate. This dispositive
pattern is still further removed from that normally reached by the
cross-remainder doctrine. The court did not mention the doctrine,
stating only that the income was not given to the life beneficiaries
as joint tenants. The alternative of accumulating the income was
dismissed for want of any direction to accumulate.
Conceding that the force of the cross-remainder doctrine as a
constructional preference does not reach either of the above cases, it
nevertheless seems that an inference of intention to grant remainders in the income was not precluded. Perhaps, however, the normal
resistance to inserting what is in effect an unexpressed dispositive
provision requires a firmer ground for inference than appeared in
these cases.
In Hartford-Connecticut Trust
v. Hartford Hospital141 the
residue of a testator's estate was to be divided into two parts. The
income from one part was to be paid to a sister for life and that from
the second part to another sister for life, with successive life interests in each part in a number of named persons. Upon the death
of the last survivor of these persons the principal was to be paid to
the defendant hospital. When all of the interests in one part had
ended, one person survived as beneficiary of the other part. In a suit
for construction the court held that the income from the part in which
all life interests had expired was to be distributed as intestate property of the testator. The court refused to imply a cross-remainder in
the survivor of the other part on the ground that such a result would
be inconsistent with the dispositive scheme, and refused to order the
accumulation of income for the benefit of the hospital on the ground
that the testator did not anticipate any dispositive gap in the distribution of income.142

Co.

141. 141 Conn. 163, 104 A.2d 356 (1954).
142. An obvious dispositive gap appeared in National Shawmut Bank v. Morey,
320 Mass. 492, 70 N.E.2d 316 (1946), in which trust income was payable to several
life beneficiaries in stated amounts and 90 per cent of the balance was payable to other
beneficiaries until the death of all the beneficiaries. The court held that the remaining
10 per cent of the income was to be added to the corpus for the benefit of the remaindermen. This judgment was based on several factors: the language giving "all the
rest, residue and remainder" of the testator's estate in trust, the direction that the
trustee was to keep all the property held in trust invested in good, safe securities, and
the direction upon termination of the trust to pay over "the then remaining sum."
See also Brown v. Wright, 168 Mass. 506, 47 N.E. 413 (1897). Cf. Abbott v. Williams,
268 Mass. 275, 167 N.E. 357 (1929).
In two other cases gaps in income interests were left by dispositions giving annu-
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Assuming that the implication of cross-remainders was not a
proper result in any of these cases, the intestacy decreed in Glaser
and Hartford seems the least defensible result. On the other hand,
the view of the Rhode Island court in Butler that otherwise undisposed-of income is an inherent incident of a gift of corpus deserves
further attention. Consider the reduction of construction problems
that might follow if that proposition were accepted as a general rule.
There are good reasons why we do not speak of a devise of land
to A for life, remainder to B, simply in terms of a prescribed succession of interests. We say rather that ownership is divided into two
estates, each of which has present incidents and value. Even under
civil law systems, which do not recognize the division of ownership
into segments dependent on the passage of time, it is possible to make
the same sort of arrangement. One can give an interest similar to a
life estate-called a usufruct-that is an encumbrance upon ownership given to someone else.
Where property is given in trust our common law conceptions
are complicated by a different division of ownership, that between
trustee and beneficiaries. During the continuance of the trust we may
speak of the beneficial interests that are given for life as equitable
life estates. They usually do not imply the right of possession, for
that usually goes to the trustee as a necessary incident of his management function. Enjoyment of the beneficial interests thus constitutes
a special sort of ownership, ·with the right to receive income its usual
main ingredient. While the customary practice of speaking of beneficial interests in trust as either income interests or interests in corpus
does serve useful purposes, we have already seen how it may be misleading when we also apply the traditional estate dichotomy of life
interests and remainders.143 A further consequence of this practice
may be the erroneous notion that income interests and interests in
ities for the duration of a trust and the balance of the income in certain circumstances-but not in the circumstances that occurred. In Foss v. State Bank B.: Trust Co,,
343 Ill. 94, 1'75 N.E. 12 (1931), the corpus was given to charities, but the court held
that the undisposed-of income was intestate property. The court justified this result
on the ground that the testator had tried to make a complete distribution of income
and had given only the corpus to the charities. In contrast, in Cotton v. Bank of Cali•
fornia, 145 Wash. 503, 261 P. 104 (192'7), the corpus was given to the testator's granddaughter, and the court held that the undisposed-of income should be given to her.
This result was reached, however, not upon any general notion that undisposed-of
income accrues to corpus, but on a finding that the granddaughter was the primary
object of the testator's bounty and that the income was needed for her support during
her minority. This seems, in other words, to amount to the implication of an income
interest, based on an inferred testamentary objective.
143. See text following note 99 supra.

August 1974]

Doctrine of Estates ·

1549

corpus are distinct and segregated entities requiring express language to bring them together in the same person.
It may be more useful both in drafting and construction to say
that a remainderman who is entitled to trust corpus has been given
all of the ingredients of ownership not given to someone else. The
very nature of the trust seems to imply that, so long as there is a
complete disposition of the corpus, there can be neither gaps in
income nor intestacy. This notion is commonly expressed by a settlor who directs the ultimate distribution of corpus and all undistributed income. I suggest that such a purpose is implied by any
gift of corpus.144 This implication, if raised to a constructional
preference, would of course yield to a different construction of specific dispositive language, including language that implies cross-remainders. In the absence of such language, speculation leading to the
possible implication of interests in income would be avoided, for
by hypothesis no gap would remain to be filled.
This at least is the assumption made by the Rhode Island court
in Butler and Aldrich.145 Another obvious problem remains, however, to which I suggest the Rhode Island court gave short shrift. If
the undisposed-of income belongs to the remaindermen, when are
they entitled to receive it? In the absence of a provision for accumulation, the court concluded that it was payable immediately. Here the
court encountered the difficulty ·with respect to accumulation of income that arises when remainder interests are contingent on survivorship. The court responded by torturing language ot find a vested
remainder that was conceded still to be subject to a requirement of
survival.
This problem requires a reexamination of traditional notions
about the accumulation of income. Most learned discourse contains
little more than an analysis of policy requirements respecting the
duration of an accumulation period. The ghost of Thellusson v.
W oodford146 still haunts all other thoughts about the accumulation
of income: If accumulation is a peculiarly objectionable fetter on
property, and is to be permitted only for very limited periods, it is
understandable why courts are reluctant to imply directions to ac144. This is not a new idea. In Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. 112, 146, 32 Eng.
Rep. 1030, 1044 (1805), the Lord Chancellor said: "[W]herever a residue of personal
estate is given, the interest goes with the bulk; and there is no more objection to giving
that person, that, which is only forming another capital, than to giving the capital
itself."
145. See t~t accompanying notes 137-39 supra.
146. 11 Ves. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1805).
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cumulate. However, since almost all states have eliminated special
statutory restrictions on accumulations of income,147 and so presumably are left only with the common law perpetuity period,148
it now seems permissible to follow a more liberal constructional
preference respecting accumulation.149
Accumulation could be ordered even though income not expressly provided for would otherwise go to residuary legatees; that is,
undisposed-of income could still go to the takers of the corpus rather
than to residuary legatees where the corpus of the property that
produces the income is expressly given at the end of the income interests. The issue in such a case is how strong the proposed rule of
construction should be in relation to normal assumptions about the
role of a residuary clause, particularly as a device for closing dispositive gaps.
For both conceptual and practical reasons, the notion I am proposing should be treated as a "residual" rule of construction. I do not
mean, however, that it is a weak rule. If an mmer of property is to be
entitled to the income earned by the corpus except as income is
specifically given to someone else, the proposed rule should be applied only when an instrument, by its express terms or in the absence
of any otherwise applicable rule of construction, leaves a gap in the
income interests.
Recent statutory amendments in Wisconsin of the Rule Against
Perpetuides150 include a new rule on accumulations.m Consistently
147. L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 4, § 1466 (Supp. 1973).
148. A number of the recent statutes repealing earlier, more restrictive limitations
on the accumulation of income have provided that an accumulation is void only
to the extent that it exceeds the common law perpetuity period. CAL. Crv. CODE § 721i
(West 1971); ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 30, § 153 (1973); IND. ANN. STAT. § 32-1-4-4 (1973);
MONT. R.Ev. CODES ANN. § 67-413 (1970); N.Y. EsrATES, POWERS & TRUSTS !.AW § 9-2,1
(McKinney 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6106 (Supp. 1974). Cf. ALA. CODE tit. 47, §
146 (1958). Since the common law accumulations restriction invalidates any direction
to accumulate income that may exceed the perpetuity period, the more liberal statu•
tory rule has a bearing on the willingness of a court to imply a direction to accumulate. Such a statute may not always be easy to apply, for it seems to embrace a
wait-and-see ingredient, but this problem is outweighed by its Jess severe frustration
of dispositive intention.
149. The Connecticut court held on one occasion that if there is no express or
implied "direction" to accumulate, but income is accumulated because the testator
provided funds for his stated purposes that turned out to be so ample that the income
to be used for such purposes did not exhaust the supply of income, there was not
such a direction to accumulate as would invoke the common law restriction upon
accumulations. Hoadley v. Beardsley, 89 Conn. 270, 93 A. 535 (1915). Cf. R.EsrATEMENT
OF PROPERTY § 439(a)(ii) (1944).
150. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (Supp. 1973).
151. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 701.21 (Supp. 1973).

August 1974]

Doctrine of Estates

1551

with the exemption from the Rule Against Perpetuities of dispositions in trust where the trustee has a power to sell, it is provided that
no direction for accumulation of income shall be invalid. Although I
am not willing to defend either of these provisions,152 special attention should be given to this further provision of the accumulations
statute:
Income not required to be distributed by the creating instrument, in the absence of a governing provision in the instrument, may
in the trustee's discretion be held in reserve for future distribution as
income or be added to principal subject to retransfer to income of
the dollar amount originally transferred to principal; but a~ the termination of the income interest, any undistributed income shall be
distributed as principal.15s

It may be that the main purpose of this section was to provide
for a reserve against deficits in distributable income, a problem
discussed below.154 But it does so in terms of a surplus of distributable
income, which can arise not only from unexpected increases in income but from dispositive gaps in income interests. The statute declares that such income, if not held in reserve, accrues to corpus,
subject to being recovered if needed. If not expended the income is
payable only with the corpus; in other words, it is to be accumulated.
These results may all be subject to the terms of the "creating instrument."165
Subject to the need for clarification, I commend the Wisconsin
provision for adoption elsewhere. In fact, if my preceding analysis of
trust dispositions in estate terms is sound, courts may be free to reach
the same results without legislation. Such a statute, however, cannot
be adopted without further amendment in any state that adheres to
a policy restriction on the accumulation of income. Although there
is little common law authority on the existence of any rule restricting
152. See ABA Committee on Rules Against Perpetuities, Further Trends in Perpetuities, 5 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE&: TRUsr J. 333 (1970).
.
153. WIS. SrAT. ANN. § 701.21(4) (Supp. 1973).
154. See section IIF infra.
155. This qualification will require interpretation. Does the statute supersede the
cross-remainder doctrine where the dispositive language would otherwise invoke that
doctrine? Would it override the precept, discussed in section IID infra, that when
income is given for a term or pur autre vie the income interest is not limited to the
life of the income beneficiary? The statute should not be construed to fill gaps that
by proper construction do not exist. It was designed as a substitute for a prior statutory provision that gave undisposed-of income to those "presumptively entitled to
the next eventual estate." Law of Aug. 8, 1957, ch. 561, § I, [1957] Wis. Laws 758 (repealed 1969). As indicated in sections IID4 and IIF2c infra, the same interpretative problem exists in states with statutes such as the latter.
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the duration of a dispositive direction for the accumulation of income, it has been declared, and is generally assumed, that such a
rule does exist. Unless otherwise provided by statute, it invalidates
any direction to accumulate income for a period that can exceed
the perpetuity period.156 In any state with an accumulations rule
the provision of the Wisconsin statute quoted above must be modified to prevent the accrual of income to corpus where such an accrual
would violate the law on the accumulation of income. The directive
of the statute concerning the maintenance of a reserve need not be
so qualified, but may be treated as authorizing a kind of accumulation
that does not invoke the restriction.167
In any state not otherwise committed by statute or precedent,
the rule of the Thellusson case158 could be adopted, under which
no accumulation of income is unlawful if all interests are valid under
the Rule Against Perpetuities. In a case (unlike Thellusson) in which
income is to be accumulated beyond the time when the interest in
the corpus vests, the problem could be treated as one of trust duration only. This would presumably mean that if the period of accumulation may exceed the perpetuity period, the Claflin doctrine150
would be rejected, and the trust would become terminable by the
beneficiaries when they become sui juris and attain indefeasibly
vested interests.160 Such a rule could be given an even more liberal
interpretation, making the trust terminable only if the beneficiaries
have indefeasibly vested interests and the perpetuity period has
expired.
The fact remains that most express or implied directions to accumulate income do not exceed the perpetuity period. In such cases
the Wisconsin statute, which provides for accumulation of any surplus of distributable income, makes sense. Although there is no
reason to encourage incomplete dispositions of trust income, there
is something to be said for giving draftsmen the security that all income not specifically disposed of will follow the principal.
156. See REsrATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 441 (1944).
157. See id. § 439(a)(ii).
158. Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1805). See note 144
supra.
159. See text following note 107 supra.
160. L. SIMES &: A. SMITII, supra note 4, § 1393. Cf. REsrATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 381
(1944). There is authority that, in the absence of an applicable statute, a trust is not
void on the ground that it may last beyond the perpetuity period. There is less
authority to the effect that the Claflin doctrine is rejected in cases of excessive trust
duration. Id.
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Income Interest for a Term of Years
or Pur Autre Vie 161
It is not uncommon to give income interests to two or more persons, not for their respective lives, but for a term of years, or for the
life of a named person (who may or may not be one of the legatees).
Such an express limitation is normally inconsistent with the implication of additional limitations. Thus, if an income interest is not
inherently a life interest, an implication of a limitation for life
would be inconsistent with any express limitation. The implication
would also leave unexplained the omission of a further gift of income
upon the income beneficiary's death. If an unlimited gift of income
is not· impliedly limited for life, there is even less reason for such
an implication where a gift of income is limited for a period other
than the beneficiary's life.
D.

I. Income Interests Held Transmissible
In cases involving gifts by will of annuities for a stated period, the
English courts have from an early date held in favor of the executor or administrator of an annuitant who died before the end of the
annuity period.162 Income interests have also been held transmissible
161. Long ago a special problem existed with respect to legal estates in land
limited pur autre vie. I£ the life tenant died before the end of the measuring life, the
estate could not devolve as personal property because it was a freehold and not a
chattel real; but since it was not an estate of inheritance, it could not descend or be
devised. This led to the peculiar rules about general and special occupants. The
English Statute of Frauds and certain American statutes have eliminated or reduced
the problem, as have those intestacy statutes that do not distinguish between real and
personal property. The problem does not arise where the limitations are of personal
property. In general the result is that such interests can descend or be devised. See
1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 2.26 (A. Casner ed. 1952); REsrATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 151 (1936).

4,

162. Bryan v. Twigg, L.R. 3 Ch. 183 (1867); In re Ord, 12 Ch. D. 22 (1879); Jones
v. Randall, 37 Eng. Rep. 313 (Ch. 1819); Savery v. Dyer, 27 Eng. Rep. 91 (Ch. 1752).
Jones v. Randall involved language that might have been regarded by some American
courts as ambiguous: An annuity was to be divided among the children of the initial
annuitant who should survive her, to be paid "during the lives of such children and
the life of the survivor." The opinion of the Master of the Rolls is instructive upon
the role of a court in such circumstances:
We cannot tell what the testator intended except so far as he has expressed it.
The safest way is to adhere to the words, and they are perfectly dear in describing
to whom the annuity was to go after the death of M. A. Randall. It was there
given to all the children who should survive her, in equal shares and proportions;
this would make them tenants in common. • ••
The words that follow only describe how long this annuity is to last; they
determine the subject-matter of the bequest, regulating the duration, but not
the persons who are to participate in it.
It is only a conjecture, that because the annuity is for the lives of the survivors, therefore the survivors are to enjoy it. That would be raising an inference
against the express words••••
37 Eng. Rep. at 314.
·
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by American courts where the interest is limited for a term of years,
for the life of a named person, or for the life of the survivor of the
legatees, and where the income is given in equal shares, as annuities,
in percentages, or for the support of the legatees.168 In Stoffels v.
Stoffels,164 for example, half of the income was given to A and half
to B, with a provision for B if A should predecease him but with no
provision for the death of B before A. B died first, and the court
held in favor of B's executor.160
A variant on the typical dispositive pattern appeared in Dyslin
v. Wolf, 166 in which income was given to the testator's children in
equal shares, with the provision that if any child died leaving a
child or children surviving, the parent's share of the income was
to be paid to such child or children. The corpus was given on the
death of the survivor of the testator's children. One of the children
died leaving two sons, one of whom subsequently died leaving a wife
and three children. The court held that the deceased son's share of
the income passed by his will to his ·widow. Rejecting the application
of the cross-remainder doctrine to these facts, the court said that the
son's interest was vested and not subject to a requirement of survival,
by which it meant that the son's interest was not limited to his lifetime. The same result was reached in Gasque v. Sitterding101 on
similar facts, except that on the death of a child leaving issue the
deceased child's share of the income was to go to his or her issue.
One child died leaving three children, and one of these, a daughter,
163. Bobys v. Bobys, 284 F. Supp. 321 (D.D.C. 1968); New Britain Trust Co. v.
Stanley, 128 Conn. 386, 23 A.2d 142 (1941); Davis v. Goodman, 17 Del, Ch. 231, 152 A.
115 (1930); Dyslin v. Wolf, 407 Ill. 532, 96 N.E.2d 485 (1950); Anderson v. Simpson,
214 Ky. 375, 283 S.W. 941 (1926); Crouch v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit &: Trust Co,, 220
Md. 140, 151 A.2d 757 (1959); Hussey v. Hussey, 323 Mass. 533, 83 N.E.2d 159 (1948);
Harrison v. Marden, 298 Mass. 148, 10 N.E.2d 109 (1937); Lich v. Lich, 158 Mo, App.
400, 138 S.W. 558 (1911); Stoffels v. Stoffels, 18 N.J. Super. 300, 86 A.2d 806 (Ch. 1952);
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Housman, 296 N.Y. 512, 68 N.E.2d 453 (1946), affg.
mem. 269 App. Div. 1059, 59 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1945), affg. mem. 59 N.Y.S.2d 880 (Sup. Ct.
1945); In re Will of Sacchi, 36 App. Div. 597, 318 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1971); In re Edelmuth's
Estate, 62 N.Y.S.2d 708 (Sur. Ct. 1946); McGlinn's Estate, 77 Pa. Super. 582 (1921);
Gasque v. Sitterding, 208 Va. 206, 156 S.E.2d 576 (1967). Cf. Rogers v. Walton, 141
Me. 91, 39 A.2d 409 (1944). See Annot., ll2 A.L.R. 581 (1938).
164. IS N.J. Super. 300, 86 A.2d 806 (Ch. 1952).
165. But see Wheeler v. Kennard, 344 Mass. 466, 182 N.E.2d 823 (1962). There was
a supplanting gift of income to the issue of either of two beneficiaries, but no such
gift if either died without issue. The Massachusetts court distinguished prior cases
that left the income in a deceased legatee's estate, on the questionable ground that
the one supplanting gift indicated that the initial income interests were intended to
be only for the lives of the respective legatees.
166. 407 Ill. 532, 96 N.E.2d 485 (1950).
167. 208 Va. 206, 156 S.E.2d 576 (1967).
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later died without issue. The interest of the deceased granddaughter
of the testator was held to remain in her estate. The court emphasized the supplanting provision on the death of a child of the testator
and the absence of such a provision respecting the interest in the
issue of a deceased child.16s
A different result was reached in Casey v. Gallagher,169 in which,
after initial life interests in income in the testator's three children,
remainders in the income were given respectively to their children,
or, if any of them should have no children, "to the other children, or
their issue if dead." One of the testator's children died leaving two
sons, one of whom died without issue before the end of the income
period. The court held that the latter's income interest passed to
his brother. Conceding the applicability of the traditional rule about
gifts of income pur autre vie, the court said that it must yield to
inferences from the whole will. The court inferred from the dispositive pattern that the testator's failure to provide for the death
of a grandchild who succeeded to the interest of his parent was inadvertent, and thus concluded that the testator intended to make
all of the interests life interests, with an appropriate cross-remainder
in the circumstances that occurred.
The court's language indicates that it was willing to accept the
full implications of its judicial will-making. That is, if the deceased
grandchild had left issue, they presumably would have succeeded to
his income interest. In other words, the will was construed so as to
give the income to the testator's issue per stirpes from time to time
living. While this seems like a sensible way to give income, it was
not what the testator said.
In Gasque the supplanting limitation on the death of a child
of the testator was in favor of his issue, not his children. Suppose
after the death of one child the child's daughter had died leaving
issue. If "issue" meant issue per stirpes, is it implicit in such a
limitation that the representation principle continues to apply until
the end of the income period? On facts similar to Casey, except that
one remainder in the income was given to the issue of a deceased
child with an alternative in the living children of the testator, a
California court reached the result that the court in Casey only sug168. This result was also reached in Crouch v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust
Co., 230 Md. 140, 151 A.2d 757 (1959), in which the initial interests in the testator's
children were limited to their respective lives.
169. 11 Ohio St. 2d 42, 227 N.E.2d 801 (1967). Cf. Wilkes v. Wilkes, 488 S.W.2d 398
(Tex. 1972).
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gested: Upon the death of a child of the testator, leaving a daughter
who later died leaving two children, the children took, not by descent
from their mother, but by the inferred terms of the will.17°
The contrast between Gasque and Casey is instructive on the
proper role of courts in the construction of wills. It exemplifies
the pervasive tension between the constructional precept that the
intention of the testator is the predominant guide and the precept
that a court will not make a will for the testator. More simply, when
does construction become reformation? The Casey court said that
the otherwise applicable rule of construction yields to the intention
inferred from the whole will. The Gasque court said that the construction reached in Casey would amount to the insertion into the
will of a set of alternative limitations upon the death of any of
the testator's grandchildren, and that it had no right to insert such
a provision. Whatever the proper limits of construction, the implication of future interests to fill dispositive gaps should be confined
to cases in which the existence of a gap is clearly evident. While a
settlor's dispositive scheme may be the basis for construction that
by implication fills a dispositive gap, construction may be unduly
strained where the inferences from a dispositive scheme are the only
basis for the discovery of a dispositive gap.
Another wrinkle would be added if the trust in any of the circumstances discussed above were spendthrift. That would, of course,
prevent any inter vivos alienation of an income interest, including
any transfer of an interest that othenvise would continue beyond
the legatee's death. Is it the purpose of a spendthrift provision to
restrain alienation of an income interest by will? However that question is decided, can spendthrift language prevent the intestate succession of the interest of a deceased beneficiary? It can if spendthrift
language is held to imply that the restricted interests are life interests. I have encountered only two cases involving the problem in
question in which the trust was identified as spendthrift. This fact
was regarded as contributing to the conclusion that the income interests were not pur autre vie but were limited to the lifetime of
the respective beneficiaries.171

2. Cross-Remainders Implied
In a number of cases of the kind discussed above the courts applied the cross-remainder doctrine, so that upon the death of one
170. In re Hartson's Trust, 200 Cal. App. 2d 757, 19 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1st Dist. 1962).
Cf. In re Nixon, 306 Pa. 261, 159 A. 442 (1932).
171. Estate of Robinson, 262 Cal. App. 2d 32, 68 Cal. Rptr. 420 (5th Dist. 1968);
In re Nixon, 306 Pa. 261, 159 A. 422 (1932).
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income. beneficiary his share of the income was given to one or more
surviving beneficiaries.172 It has already been observed that this doctrine is properly applicable only where the several income interests
are limited for the respective lives of the beneficiaries.173 In cases
in which there were no such express limitations, some courts have
nevertheless declared or assumed that the respective income interests
were intended to be life interests.174 Unless one assumes that income
interests are necessarily life interests, at least in these circumstances,
there was in most of these cases no dispositive language justifying
the result. In several cases the courts simply applied the crossremainder doctrine as though it were not limited to cases in which
concurrent life interests are given in income.175 It has been observed
that this assumption is objectionable because it precludes specific
inquiry into the result that is assumed, but that section 143(2) of
the Restatement (Second) of Trusts supports such an implication.176
The New Jersey court recently relied on that section to justify its
implication of cross-remainders.177
172. E.g., Hartford Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. Harvey, 143 Conn. 233, 121 A.2d
276 (1956); Kramer v. Sangamon Loan & Trust Co., 293 Ill. 553, 127 N.E. 877 (1920);
In re Young's Will, 248 Iowa 309, 79 N.W.2d 376 (1956); In re Estate of Conway, 59
N.J. 221, 280 A.2d 189 (1971). Cf. Casey v. Gallagher, 11 Ohio St. 2d 42, 227 N.E.2d
801 (1967), discussed in text accompanying note 169 supra. In Bates v. Barry, 125 Mass.
83 (1878), the court held merely that a 500 dollar annuity for ten years was not payable to the administrator of the annuitant, who died during the period, because no
words of inheritance were used. Presumably this would no longer be a ground for
finding that ouly a life interest was given. See the Massachusetts cases cited note 163
supra.
178. See text preceding note 130 supra.
174. Hartford Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. Harvey, 143 Conn. 233, 121 A.2d 276
(1956); Norman v. Prince, 40 R.I. 402, 101 A. 126 (1917).
175. Kramer v. Sangamon Loan & Trust Co., 293 Ill. 553, 127 N.E. 877 (1920); In re
Young's Will, 248 Iowa 309, 79 N.W.2d 376 (1956); In re Estate of Conway, 59 N.J.
221, 280 A.2d 189 (1971).
176. See text accompanying note 131 supra.
177. In re Estate of Conway, 59 N.J. 221, 280 A.2d 189 (1971).
In First Natl. Bank & Trust Co. v. Palmer, 261 N.Y. 13, 184 N.E. 477 (1933), the
testatrix undertook to distribute income to her husband, a sister, and her son. The
will included language giving income to her husband during the life of her son. She
undertook to prescribe a variety of redistributions on the death of one or the other of
these persons, but failed to prescribe the result in the event of the death of both
the sister and husband in the lifetime of the son. Without referring to any crossremainder doctrine, the court said that the will was "instinct" with the intention that
except as otherwise provided, the son was to benefit. This means that the gift to the
husband during the life of the son was assumed to be also limited to his own life.
Under such a disposition, that inference may seem justified.
In Norman v. Prince, 40 R.I. 402, 101 A. 126 (1917), 2,000 dollars of annual trust
income was given to the testator's widow, the "residue" to be divided among his
children, with a gift of corpus upon the death of the widow and the children. On
the death of the widow, it was held that all the income was payable to the children.
This result turned on nvo inferences: that income was given to the widow for her
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A problem inherent in implying cross-remainders where income
interests are given for periods other than the lives of the beneficiaries
is the possibility that all of the income beneficiaries will die before
the end of the stated income period. It could be argued that the
implication of cross-remainders does not necessarily mean that each
income interest is a life interest, but rather that each such interest
is subject to a gift over on death leaving one or more surviving
takers. This would mean that the last survivor takes an interest that
terminates only at the end of the income period, so that on his
death the income interest would pass through his estate. I know
of no case, however, that has so held, and two courts have held
otherwise. The Massachusetts court has held that the undisposed-of
income passed to the residuary legatees, 178 while a federal court has
held that the income should be accumulated. 178 In the latter case
the same persons were apparently entitled to the income whether
they took the income by intestacy or whether the income passed
to the ultimate takers of the corpus. But it is significant that the
court said "[the income] is part of the trust estate and not subject
to distribution until 'the trust shall cease and determine.' " 180
3. Class Gifts of Income
Several courts have treated the gift of income to a class as though
it avoids the problem raised by an income gift not expressly limited
to the respective lives of the beneficiaries. Upon the death of any
member of the class, the surviving class members take his share of
the income unless it is othenvise provided. 181 In all but one of these
cases182 the wills also contained provisions for paying income to
the issue of deceased legatees, but no provisions for the death of
support and personal benefit, and therefore it was intended to continue only for her
life. The court also relied on Bates v. Barry, 125 Mass. 83 (1878), for the proposition
that the lack of words of inheritance indicates a life interest. The income previously
paid to the widow was thus distributable as part of the "residue" given to the
children. Cf. Stanley v. Stanley, 108 Conn. 100, 142 A. 851 (1928).
178. Wheeler v. Kennard, 344 Mass. 466, 182 N.E.2d 823 (1962).
179. American Security & Trust Co. v. Blair, 70 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
180. 70 F.2d at 776. These two cases are relevant to the problem of treating gifts
of corpus impliedly to include income not disposed of otherwise. See section IIC supra.
181. E.g., Bank of Delaware v. Kane, 285 A.2d 440 (Del. Ch. 1971); Maxwell's Estate,
261 Pa. 140, 104 A. 501 (1918); In re Boyer's Estate, 115 Pa. Super. 501, 175 A. 728
(1934); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Thomas, 73 R.I. 277, 54 A.2d 432 (1947). The
Pennsylvania cases cited above relied on Rowland's Estate, 151 Pa. 25, 24 A. 1091
(1892), in which the class involved was issue per stirpes. Such language, together with
other language, led the court to believe that the intention was in fact to give to issue
from time to time living.
182. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Treadwell, 312 Mass. 214, 43 N.E.2d 777 (1942).
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legatees without issue. In only one of the last mentioned cases, however, did the presence of the supplanting limitation have a bearing
on the o~tcome. The Pennsylvania court made· it clear that if the
gift were not to a class, it would hold that a deceased legatee's interest would pass through his estate.183 The Rhode Island court
implied the same in a case in which a class gift was found even
though all the members of the class had been named.184 The principle announced by these courts amounts to the implication of two
provisions: the interest of each class member is limited to his lifetime, and cross-remainders are given to the survivors.
The Massachusetts court reached the same result where the income beneficiaries were named, on the ground that the rule preventing a class designation where the class members are named must yield
to the testator's intention.185 Where, as in that case, the corpus is
given on the death of all of the income beneficiaries, the interest
of the survivor of them is in effect a life interest. This may have
been the basis of the inference that all the interests were so limited.
It does not require resort to a class doctrine to imply crossremainders where life interests are given with a remainder upon
the end of all of the life interests. Perhaps the presence of a class
gift of income does tend to fortify the implication, but the rub
comes in implying that a class gift of income is a gift for the respective lives of the class members. No constructional doctrine justifies
such a limitation. In fact, it seems at least analogous to the error
made by a few courts in holding that a remainder to a class implies
a condition of survivorship.186 This analysis erroneously assumes that
if a class is subject to increase it is also subject to decrease.
If income is given to a person's issue per stirpes, however, the
stirpital distribution may imply that a qualifying taker's issue should
supplant him if he should die during the income period leaving
issue. This result was reached in Rowland's Estate,187 improperly
relied upon by the Pennsylvania court in later cases as authority
for assuming income interests to be life interests in any case in which
such interests are given to a class.188
183. Maxwell's Estate, 261 Pa. 140, 104 A. 501 (1918).
184. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Thomas, 73 R.I. 277, 54 A.2d 432 (1947).
185. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Treadwell, 312 Mass. 214, 43 N.E.2d 777 (1942).
186. E.g., Jones v. Holland, 223 S.C. 500, 77 S.E.2d 202 (1953). See L. SIMES & A.
SMITH, supra note 4, § 146 n.64 (the Tennessee "class doctrine'').
187. 151 Pa. 25, 24 A. 1091 (1892).
188. See note 181 supra and accompanying text.
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4. "Next Eventual Estate"
In In re Thall trust income was to be paid to the testator's
widow, his sister, and the sister's two sons in equal shares, and the
corpus was given on the death of the widow to the other three. Other
alternative gifts of corpus were provided: on the death of the sister
before the widow, her share to her two sons; on the death of either
of these nephews before the widow, his share to his surviving children, if any, or, if not, to the surviving nephew. The widow was
predeceased first by one nephew who left a daughter, and then by
the sister and the other nephew, both without issue. No explicit
provision had been made for these circumstances. The court held
that the daughter of the one nephew was entitled to the corpus.100
The court assumed that the income was also undisposed of, and held
that it, too, should be given to the testator's surviving grandniece
under section 63 of the New York Real Property Law,101 since she
was the person "presumptively entitled to the next eventual estate."
The statute cited was part of early legislation restricting accumulation of income. It was designed primarily to govern the disposition
of income released by a ruling that an unlawful accumulation had
been directed. Thall and earlier cases held the statute applicable
whenever income is not disposed of, even though there is no unlawful
accumulation or suspension of the power of alienation. The section
has recently been amended expressly so to provide.192
The application of the statute in Thall depended on a finding
that the income was not disposed of by the trust instrument. Since
the income interests were without express limitation other than
by the direction to pay corpus on the death of the widow, they were
really given pur autre vie and so were disposable property in the
estates of the deceased beneficiaries. The court's finding of a gap in
the income interests must therefore have rested on the assumption
189

189. 18 N.Y.2d 186, 273 N.Y.S.2d 33, 219 N.E.2d 397 (1966).
190. This construction is at least questionable. Without here outlining all of the
relevant provisions of the will, it is arguable that one half of the corpus should have
passed through the estate of the last surviving beneficiary, who died without issue.
191. "When, in consequence of a valid limitation of a future interest, there is a
suspension of the power of alienation, or of the ownership, during the continuance of
which the rents and profits are undisposed of, and no valid direction for their accu•
mulation is given, such rents and profits sh:iil belong to the persons presumptively
entitled to the next eventual estate." Law of May I, 1916, ch. 364, § 63, [1916] N.Y.
Laws 974 (repealed 1966).
192. N.Y. ESTATES, PoWERS &: TRUSTS LAW § 9-2.3 (McKinney 1967): "When income
is not disposed of and no valid direction is given for its accumulation it passes to the
persons presumptively entitled to the next eventual estate,"
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that the interests were for the life of each of the beneficiaries. The
assumption was left unstated and thus unsupported.193
A California court104 reached the same result as in Thall by applying an identical statute.195 The court expressly refused either to
construe the gift as pur autre vie or to imply cross-remainders, on
the ground that neither was consistent with the testator's intention.
Several factors were cited, including the facts that the trust was
spendthrift and that the income was given to provide for the needs
of the income beneficiaries. In other words, the income interests
were only life interests in the amounts initially given to each.196

E. Gifts upon a Stated Event
Where property is given upon the attainment of a certain age, or
upon marriage, or at the end of a stated period of time, the problem
most often encountered is whether such a gift is conditional upon
survival to the stated future time.197 It is not my purpose to reexamine that problem. Under any construction, however, a subordinate problem may arise from the failure of the instrument, where
the limitations are in trust, to provide for the disposition of income
between the death of the donee and the occurrence of the stated
event.
Where the gift is found to be indefeasibly vested, it is not surprising to find cases holding that the income belongs to the donee.198
193. No mention was made in Thall of City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Housman,
296 N.Y. 512, 68 N.E.2d 453 (1946), afjg. mem. 269 App. Div. 1059, 59 N.Y.S.2d 626
(1945), a[fg. mem. 59 N.Y.S.2d 880 (Sup. Ct. 1945), in which it was held that income
payable to a substituted beneficiary passed on her death before the end of the income
period to her executor. The statutory provision about undisposed-of income was rejected, presumably on the ground that there was no such income.
194. In re Estate of Robinson, 262 Cal. App. 2d 32, 68 Cal. Rptr. 420 (5th Dist.
1968).
195. CAL. CIV. CoDE § '733 (West 1954).
196. Interpretation of the statutory language referring to the "next eventual
estate" has produced considerable litigation in New York, AMERICAN LA.w OF PROPERTY,
supra note 161, § 25.111, which need not be pursued here. The statute almost eliminates the possibility that trust income can be intestate or passed to residuary legatees,
unless the heirs or legatees happen to be the takers of the next eventual estate. In
other words, the statute expresses the principle that income belongs to the presumptive
takers of the corpus, unless it is othenvise disposed of, or unless the next eventual
estate is itself an income interest. Such a statute prevents an implied accumulation
of income where the only basis for such implication is that the instrument does
not expressly, or upon proper construction, dispose of the income. The main difficulty
with these statutes is that, where one or more contingent or defeasible remainders are
given, the income may go to persons who do not eventually enjoy the remainder. In
fact, some difficulty may be encountered in deciding who are the persons presumptively entitled to the next eventual estate.
19'7. See. L. SIMES&: A. SMITH, supra note 4, §§ 586-8'7, 592.
198. Stinson v. Palmer, 146 Conn. 335, 150 A.2d 600 (1959) (age); Feinberg v.

1562

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 72:1507

In view of the nature of the gift, it also may not be surprising when
accumulation is directed and payment made with the principal at
the stated time.199 How does one describe the interests given in such
circumstances? Where the income is expressly or impliedly payable
to the legatees as it accrues, the interest is an equitable fee estate,
If, however, the interest is to be accumulated for the legatees, it is a
future interest.200 But how under the doctrine of estates may an
interest be called a future interest where there is no present beneficial interest in anyone else? We seem to have come this far without
the need for a label for this unique property interest.
Where survival to the designated time or event is held a condition precedent to the gift, the question of title to intermediate income is not likely to arise, because in the usual case the donee has
died before the stated time. In such a case it is likely that both income
and principal will go to residuary legatees or by intestacy. The problem is further narrowed by the implication of a gift of income if the
donor stands in loco parentis to the donee, 201 which may in turn
eliminate any condition of survivorship. In Allen v. Burkhiser, 202
however, the residue of an estate was given to named grandnieces
and grandnephews "when they reach the age of 21 years." In a suit
for construction after one grandnephew had reached 21, but when
all of the others were under that age, the court held that attainment
of the age was a condition precedent to enjoyment. The court also
held that the testator died intestate as to each share until the contingency was satisfied. Accordingly, the entire residue was vested in
the testator's brother, his sole heir, subject to divestment upon the
happening of the contingency. The court directed that a trustee be
appointed to conserve the estate in the interim. Nothing was said
about what the trustee was to do with the interim income. Did it
belong to the brother? Or is it implicit that in conserving the estate
the trustee was to accumulate the income for the benefit of those
who were ultimately entitled to the principal? Where a testator expressly gives such income as it accrues to the legatees, it is usually
Feinberg, 36 Del. Ch. 438, 131 A.2d 658 (1957) (marriage); Alden v. Meling, 185 Iowa
394, 170 N.W. 757 (1919) (five years); Hickman v. Hickman, 190 S.2d 853 (Miss. 1966)
(begin college); In re Balsamo, 136 Misc. 113, 240 N.Y.S. 528 (Sur. Ct. 1930) (age); New
England Trust Co. v. Brown, 44 R.I. 87, 115 A. 641 (1922) (age); see Claflin v. Claflin,
149 Mass. 19, 23, 20 N.E. 454, 456 (1889) (age).
199.
200.
201.
202.

The cases cited note 198 supra uniformly so held.
See REsrATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 153 (1936).
L. SIMES &: A. SMITH, supra note 4, § 589.
125 N.J. Eq. 524, 6 A.2d 656 (Ch, 1939).
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held that this negates a condition of survivorship.203 This construction, however, should not determine who is ultimately entitled to
income about which the testator said nothing. It is one thing to say
that an heir may ultimately be entitled to the income together with
the principal of any share that fails to vest, but it is another to say
that the heir is entitled to the income as it accrues upon a share that
ultimately vests in someone else. Only a notion that an estate in
income is a separate entity from an estate in corpus requires the
latter result. I have suggested a better construction, implicit in the
doctrine of estates: When property is given expressly or impliedly
in trust, the taker of a future interest is entitled to all interim
beneficial enjoyment not given to someone else.204 Where the interest
in the principal is indefeasibly vested, the legatee is entitled to income not given to someone else. The question may remain whether
he is so entitled as it accrues or only when ·the principal is payable.
When the interest in the principal is a contingent future interest,
or defeasible on death, the same line of reasoning would entitle the
legatee to income not given to someone else, but he would not be
entitled to it if his interest in the principal fails to vest or is divested.
This must mean that it is to be accumulated in the interim.205 Where
gifts upon a future event are to be paid out of residue or a fund,
the balance of which is otherwise disposed of, the language and circumstances may indicate that intermediate income is to go to persons
other than those to whom the future legacies are given.
It is obvious that terse language making gifts at a certain age, or
the like, is inadequate. Where personal property is involved a trust
should be used. It should be made clear whether the gifts are merely
payable on the future event or whether survival is required; if survival is required, one or more alternative gifts should be made; and
in any event, explicit directions should be given about the disposition of intermediate income. Dispositions of this sort are common,
but the challenge to the draftsman is much greater than normally
supposed.206

F. Surplus Income and Deficits in Income
In the situations considered above an ostensible gap in income
interests arose from a failure to provide for all the circumstances
203. L. SIMES &: A. SMITH, supra note 4, § 588.
204. See text accompanying notes 142-44 supra.
205. Cf. Industrial Trust Co. v. Hall, 66 R.I. 201, 18 A.2d 629 (1941).
206. See Browder, Recent Patterns of Testate Succession in the United States and
England, 67 MICH, L. Rlw. 1303, 1333 (1969),
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affecting a pattern of income distribution. One such circumstance
is often the death of an income beneficiary. We have seen that one
of the main questions in such a case is whether in fact there is a gap
in the· income interests, an issue that often can be put in terms of
whether an income interest is only a life interest. Similar questions
are involved in the cases considered in this section. Usually, however, there is no doubt that a gap exists under the express terms
of the instrument; the gap arises because income is given for a stated
purpose or in stated amounts, and more or less income is produced
than is required for such purpose or amounts.
I. Trusts for Support

Where income, together with corpus or a power to invade corpus,
is to be used for the support of one or more beneficiaries, the gift
over at the end of the trust period should expressly include both
corpus and any income not expended. Where the instrument is not
explicit in this respect, the same result is usually decreed; that is,
income not paid for the stated purpose is ordered accumulated.207
Such a ruling has two ingredients. It should go without saying
that all of the income of the trust is to be available for the stated
purpose. Simply because it is in the nature of income gifts that distribution is made periodically it does not follow that, if at any particular distribution of income there is a surplus, that surplus is freed
from the stated purpose of the trust208 (unless the dispositive language and circumstances indicate such a result200). This should be
reflected in the administrative and accounting practices of the trustee,
although it makes little difference how the surplus income is designated if a power to invade the corpus is given.210
The other ingredient of the rule decreeing accumulation is that
at the end of the income period income not expended for the stated
purpose belongs to the takers of the corpus.211 Although judicial
207. Brown v. Mead, 121 Conn. 1, 183 A. 27 (1936); Bridgeport-City Trust Co. v.
Beach, 119 Conn. 131, 174 A. 308 (1934); Jarezki v. Strong, 98 Conn. 357, 119 A. 353
(1923); In re Estate of Hartt, 88 Ill. App. 2d 146, 232 N.E.2d 231 (1967); Demeritt v.
Young, 72 N.H. 202, 55 A. 1047 (1903); New York Trust Co. v. Murray, 120 N.J. Eq.
494, 186 A. 531 (Ch. 1936); Thurber v. Thurber, 43 R.I. 504, 112 A. 209 (1921). Cf.
Eldred v. Shaw, 112 Mich. 237, 70 N.W. 545 (1897).
208. Robinson v. Bonaparte, 102 Md. 63, 61 A. 212 (1905); Perry v. Brown, 34 R.I.
203, 83 A. 8 (1912). The cases cited note 207 supra declare or imply this limitation.
See also Stempel v. Middletown Trust Co., 127 Conn. 206, 219, 15 A~d 305, 310 (1940).
209. In re Estate of :Baker, 61 N.J. Eq. 592, 47 A. 1046 (Prerog. 1901).
210. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 701.21(4) (Supp. 1973), cited note 153 supra. Cf. New York
Trust Co. v. Murray, 110 N.J. Eq. 494, 186 A. 531 (Ch. 1936).
211. See cases cited note 207 supra. In Rhodes' Estate, 147 Pa. 227, 23 A. 553 (1892),
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opinions are not generally cast in these terms, the result exemplifies
and supports the proposition I have previously advanced-that income accrues to corpus unless it is otherwise disposed of. However,
vague language in limitations of this sort may lead a court to find
that all of the income is given to a beneficiary, and that language
regarding support is a direction about its use, and not a limitation
on the amount given.212
Although there is usually little excuse for a holding that surplus
income passes by a residuary clause or by intestacy, Stempel v. Middletown Trust Co.218 was a special case. Income, and principal as
necessary, were to be used to provide support for a daughter of the
testatrix, and, under more restricted circumstances, for the support
of a sister. There was a gift on the death of the survivor of all of the
income then remaining to another daughter, Olive, for life. Alternative gifts of principal were made to Olive's issue living at her
death or to the heirs at law of the testatrix. The productivity of
the trust estate increased greatly over the years, leaving a large
amount not needed for the benefit of the two initial beneficiaries.
Olive and her children, however, were in dire financial need. After
years of controversy over the will, including the making and contesting of two agreements between Olive and the trustees, the court
held that the surplus income was intestate property of the testatrix,
so that Olive was entitled to a part of it.
The court addressed the question of the accumulation of income
and restated its previous declarations that there should be no accumulation contrary to the testator's scheme, or even where the will
disclosed no intention in that regard. Here, the court said, the testatrix anticipated no surplus-a fact indicated by the power to invade
corpus-and therefore had no intention about accumulation. The
validity of that inference aside, the anterior question as to who was
entitled to the surplus income was addressed by the court only by
way of its assumption that if the testatrix had contemplated a surplus, she undoubtedly would have given it to Olive. It could in fact
be argued that under the will as written Olive was entitled to all of
the surplus income, at least after the death of the initial beneficiaries.
however, in which excess income was to be used to pay liens on real property and
the expenses of maintenance, the excess after such purposes were satisfied was held
to pass by intestacy. The accumulation of such income was said to be contrary to the
applicable accumulations statute.

212. Reference is made to the cases in which income and sometimes principal is
given for support, but with no limitation on the duration of the income interests.
See text accompanying note 91 supra.
213. 127 Conn. 206, 15 A.2d 805 (1940).
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But that would have been little comfort to Olive, whose need was
immediate.214
2. Gifts of Income in Stated Amounts

The flexibility inherent in gifts of trust income permits periodic
payments of stated sums of money. These can be called annuities,
subject to a caveat respecting the ambiguities of this term explored
below.215 A dispositive gap may be created where such interests are
given for stated periods of time and followed by gifts of corpus, if
the trust estate produces more than the total of such gifts. Courts
have disposed of a surplus of this sort in a variety of ways.
a. Accumulation.216 A number of courts have held that the surplus income remains in the trust to be accumulated. 217 The ultimate
beneficiaries are the persons to whom the corpus is given.
Most of the courts that have so held did not face the questionanalogous to that mentioned above in the discussion of gifts of income for support-whether a reserve of surplus income should be
established to make up a possible deficit in future income. The
cases are divided on this question,218 which has been made to tum
on inferences from particular dispositive pattems.219 Factors indi214. The Stempel court qualified its ruling by saying that in determining the
amount required for the support of the surviving initial income beneficiary, the
trustee "may properly include a reasonable reserve" to provide a substantial safe•
guard for her future use. 127 Conn. at 219, 15 A.2d at 310. A more liberal attitude
about the accumulation of income would have made the surplus income a part of
the fund that would ultimately benefit Olive and her children. That would not have
helped Olive immediately, but it might have been more consistent with the testator's
sclieme.
215. See section IlG- infra.
216. In connection with the problems discussed in this subsection and in subsec•
tion IIFI supra see the treatment of surplus income and income deficits in the
Wisconsin statute discussed in text accompanying notes 150-55 supra.
217. Hartford Natl. 13ank &: Trust Co. v. Yearly Meeting of Friends, 137 Conn,
648, 81 A.2d 104 (1951); Springfield Safe Deposit &: Trust Co. v. Friele, 304 Mass. 224,
23 N.E.2d 138 (1939); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Bethesda Gen. Hosp., 446
S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1969); Tobler v. Montcrief, 72 N.J. Super. 48, 178 A.2d 105 (Ch.
1962); Wacliovia 13ank &: Trust Co. v. Dodson, 260 N.C. 22, 131 S.E.2d 875 (1963). Cf.
Colonial 13ank &: Trust Co. v. Stevens, 164 Conn. 31, 316 A.2d 768 (1972), cited note
77 supra.
218. For a reserve: Weeks v. Pierce, 279 Mass. 108, 181 N.E. 231 (1932); Smith Trust,
385 Pa. 416, 123 A.2d 623 (1956); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Peck, 40 R.I, 519,
1101 A. 430 (1917). Contra, Willson v. Tyson, 61 Md. 575 (1884); In re Ebbett's Will,
46 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Sur. Ct. 1944). See also cases cited note 223 infra, denying that sur•
plus income at any time of distribution is available to make up past deficits. Accumulation of a reserve has also been denied where it would violate an old statute
restricting the period of accumulation. Spencer v. Spencer, 38 App. Div. 403, 56 N.Y.S.
460 (1899). However, the court in Smith Trust, 385 Pa. 416, 123 A.2d 623 (1956), held
that sucli a statute is not violated by an accumulation in aid of the judicious management of the trust.
219. The Pennsylvania court, however, has declared a constructional preference
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eating that no reserve was intended include a direction to trustees
to set aside sufficient funds to produce a certain annual sum220 and a
disposition of the balance after the initial income interest is satisfied.
Any reserve for future deficits in the latter case would invade the
sum othenvise payable to the subsidiary legatee.221
A related question is whether surplus income may be used to
make up past deficits in the income available for distribution. A
number of cases have held that it should be so used, in the absence
of language or circumstances indicating othenvise; 222 but there are
an imposing number of decisions to the contrary.223 It is clear from
the cases that this issue turns on the particular dispositive scheme
and extrinsic circumstances. No constructional preference for or
against making up past deficits is evident. Among the relevant factors
are the size of the trust estate, the amount of the accumulated deficit,
whether the claim is made by a personal representative after the
death of the beneficiary, and the existence of or degree of kinship
between the beneficiary and the testator. Where income is given
in stated amounts, followed by similar gifts purporting to exhaust
the available income, use of the income to make up past deficits has
been denied on the ground that there can be no surplus income at
any particular distribution.224
A decision to accumulate for the benefit of remaindermen may
also tum on the breadth of the language directing the payment of
corpus.225 It is easy to hold that the distribution includes accumufor accumulation of a reserve. See Smith Trust, 385 Pa. 416, 419, 123 A.2d 623, 625
(1956).
220. In re Ebbett's Will, 46 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Sur. Ct. 1944).
221. Willson v. Tyson, 61 Md. 575 (1884). But cf. Smith Trust, 385 Pa. 416, 123
A.2d 623 (1956).
222. E.g., Willson v. Tyson, 61 Md. 575 (1884); Forbush v. Home for Aged Women,
241 Mass. 433, 135 N.E. 474 (1922); In re Lowrie's Estate, 294 Mich. 298, 293 N.W. 656
(1940); In re Estate of Carter, 34 Misc. 2d 106, 226 N.Y.S.2d 879 (Sur. Ct. 1962). See
2 A. Scorr, supra note 1, § 128.7 n.20; Annot., 93 AL.R.2d 203 (1964). Cf. In re
Ebbett's Will, 46 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Sur. Ct. 1944), in which the court held both for and
against making up past deficits with respect to two different provisions of the will.
223. Estate of Markham v. Palmer, 28 Cal. 2d 69, 168 P.2d 669 (1946); BridgeportCity Trust Co. v. Leeds, 134 Conn. 133, 55 A.2d 869 (1947); First Natl. Bank v. Cleveland
Trust Co., 308 Ill. App. 639, 32 N.E.2d 964 (1941); Dwight Estate, 389 Pa. 520, 134
A.2d 45 (1957); Elmore Estate, 379 Pa. 155, 108 A.2d 803 (1954). Cf. In re Ebbett's
Will, 46 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Sur. Ct. 1944).
224. Bridgeport-City Trust Co. v. Leeds, 134 Conn. 133, 55 A.2d 869 (1947); Ginns
v. Topkis, 32 Del. Ch. 99, 80 A.2d 500 (1951).
225. In St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Bethesda Gen. Hosp., 446 S.W.2d 823, 825
(Mo. 1969), "all of the assets then constituting the trust estate" were given to the
defendant hospital; in Tobler v. Moncrief, 72 N.J. Super. 48, 51, 178 A.2d 105, 107
(Ch. 1962), the ultimate gift was of "the principal as it shall then exist."
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lated income when the will directs payment of the "residue" after
the termination of the income interests.226 Draftsmen may avoid a
problem on this point either by making an express disposition of
surplus income or by using language giving corpus and any income
not required for the stated purposes.
In one case227 a court recognized that while there is, according
to the Restatement,228 a constructional preference against the accumulation of income, an intent to accumulate may nonetheless be
inferred.229 The court stated that a more liberal interpretation was
justified where the principal was given to a charity. Another court
has stated that accumulation should be permitted where a will discloses an intent to accumulate income, or where distribution as it
accrues is contrary to the scheme of the will.230
b. Income legatee entitled. In several cases in which periodic
payments of specified sums were directed, income in excess of the
amount necessary to make such payments has been held payable
to the designated legatee.231 The simplest ground for such a decision
is that the sum was stated as a minimum only.232 In several of these
cases there was also a power to invade corpus, or the gift was made
in terms that did not exclude corpus as a source of payment, but it
was not clear that these were controlling factors. The courts were
evidently motivated by a resistance to accumulation, 233 although
that does not explain why the surplus income should go to the
beneficiary _rather than to someone else. Nor does the attempt to
avoid intestacy, also evident, explain why the beneficiary should
take rather than those to whom the corpus is given. Where trustees
are directed to set aside funds sufficient to produce a certain annual
income and "such income" is to be paid to the legatee, however,
226. Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Friele, 304 Mass. 224, 23 N.E.2d 138
(1939); Weeks v. Pierce, 279 Mass. 108, 181 N.E. 231 (1932).
227. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Bethesda Gen. Hosp., 446 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1969),
228. ID:s'rATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 440 (1944).
229. The court relied on ID:s'rATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 439 (1944).
230. Hartford Natl. Bank &: Trust Co. v. Yearly Meeting of Friends, 137 Conn.
648, 81 A.2d 104, 107 (1951).
231. Fidelity&: Columbia Trust Co. v. Lucas, 66 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1933); Hunsinger
v. Rouse, 344 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1961); First Natl. Bank v. Stevenson, 293 S.W.2d 362
(Mo. 1956); Estate of Lindsay, 260 Wis. 19, 49 N.W.2d 736 (1951). See also cases cited
note 234 infra.
232. Hunsinger v. Rouse, 344 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1961); First Natl. Bank v. Stevenson,
293 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1956).
233. Cf. Fidelity &: Columbia Trust Co. v. Lucas, 66 F,2d 116 (6th Cir. 1933), in
which the obvious resistance to accumulation related to whether the income was tax•
able to the trust at a high surtax rate rather than to each of three income legatees,
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the language may support the construction that the income given
is not limited to the sum stated.234
c. Next eventual estate. In several New York and California
cases income in excess of that required to pay an annuity was held
to go by statute to those persons who were presumptively entitled to
the next eventual estate.235 In one such case the corpus was given
to the issue of the annuitant,236 and in another to the two annuitants
themselves, subject to a supplanting gift to the issue of a deceased
annuitant.237 Under the then applicable accumulations statute an
implied direction to accumulate the excess income could not have
been sustained, but under the statutory direction for undisposed-of
income the excess could be paid to persons who would take the
corpus if they survived the termination of the trust. This was the
result in both cases: In one case, the one living child of the annuitant
was held entitled to all the income until other issue were born; in
the other case the annuitants themselves were held entitled to the
excess income. In a third case238 the corpus was to go to the beneficiary's issue in default of his appointment. The beneficiary had no
issue, and the surplus income was held payable to him. As the sole
heir of the testator he was the person who for the time being was
presumptively entitled to the next eventual estate.239
d. To residue or intestate. In a number of cases surplus income
has been held payable as it accrues to residuary legatees or to the
takers of the intestate property of the settlor. It may seem obvious
234. In re Will of Sabin, 28 Misc. 2d 941, 216 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sur. Ct. 1961); In re
Doerschuck's Will, 79 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sur. Ct. 1948). See 2 A. Scorr, supra note I, § 128.7
n.27. Several other New York surrogate court cases have favored the -income legatee.
See In re Estate of Hirschhorn, 22 Misc. 2d 898, 196 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Sur. Ct. 1959), afjd.,
12 App. Div. 2d 604, 210 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1960), and cases cited therein; In re Krasner's
Will, 158 N.Y.S.2d 86 (Sur. Ct. 1956), and cases cited therein; In re Estate of Harde, 149
N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sur. Ct. 1956). These cryptic opinions reflect an effort to avoid unlawful
accumulation and a feeling by the courts that the testator would have preferred the
income legatee to take rather than the takers of the next eventual estate. In In re
Estate of Harde, 149 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sur. Ct. 1956), there is language indicating that
the result is a simple sort of compensation for possible future deficits.
235. Estate of Charters v. Yeakel, 46 Cal. 2d 227, 293 P.2d 778 (1956); In re Estate
of Hagyma, 46 Misc. 2d 492, 259 N.Y.S.2d 942 (Sur. Ct. 1965); In re Will of Krebs, 10
Misc. 2d 867, 173 N.Y.S.2d 480 (Sur. Ct. 1958). For the applicable accumulations
statutes see notes 191-92, 195 supra.
236. Estate of Charters v. Yeakel, 46 Cal. 2d 22%293 P .2d 778 (1956).
237. In re Will of Krebs, 10 Misc. 2d 867, 173 N.Y.S. 480 (Sur. Ct. 1958).
238. In re Estate of Hagyma, 46 Misc. 2d 492, 259 N.Y.S.2d 942 (Sur. Ct. 1965).
239. See also Swetland v. Swetland, 100 N.J. Eq. 196, 134 A. 822 (Ch. 1926), afjd. on
other grounds, 102 N.J. Eq. 294, 140 A. 279 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1928), in which the court,
applying New York law to part of the property disposed of, held that the surplus
income was intestate property and passed to the testator's children, who, as next of kin,
were entitled to the next eventual estate.
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that the residuary legatees should take the surplus income where the
only provision other than the income gift is a residuary gift. But
when are they entitled to receive it?
The nature of the residuary gifts created a special problem in this
regard in two Connecticut cases. In Shephard v. Union & New
Haven Trust Co.240 the testator gave several annuities for limited
periods. The residue was given to the testator's grandchildren, half
at age thirty and half at age fifty, with gifts over to the children of
any grandchild who died before attaining the stated ages. The court
held that the supplanting gifts to the children of any grandchild who
was born after the testator's death were void under the Rule Against
Perpetuities. It was also argued that the trust was void as resulting
in an unlawful accumulation of income, but the court avoided that
issue by construing the will as not providing for the accumulation
of income in excess of that needed for the annuities. It was aided in
this construction by a failure to discover any intention by the testator
to accumulate income for his grandchildren. Since it was also assumed that the grandchildren were not entitled to any benefits before attaining the stated ages, the only remaining alternative was to
direct the disposition of the surplus income by intestacy.241
A similar result was reached by the same court in Belcher v.
Phelps,242 in which the testator gave life annuities to three relatives
and half of the residue to the surviving children of a grandson. The
court was troubled by a possible unlawful accumulation of surplus
income; in fact no such violation existed, because the surplus income could not be accumulated beyond the life of the testator's
grandson. Again the court found no intent to deprive interested
parties of the benefit of the income, even during the lifetime of the
grandson, and the resulting intestacy permitted the grandson to enjoy the released income as the testator's sole heir at law. It is interesting that the other half of the residue was given to the children of a
niece, without any condition of survivorship. Without disclosing
whether the niece was still living, and after finding that her children's interests were vested, the court ordered half of the then
accumulated surplus income and half of the corpus of the residue
240. 106 Conn. 627, 138 A. 809 (1927).
241. Cf. Kenworthy's Estate, 230 Pa. 606, '19 A. 803 (1911), in which a similar re•
suit was reached respecting income that could not have been accumulated until the

distribution of corpus because of the then applicable statute on accumulations. Cf. also
Rhodes Estate, 147 Pa. 227, 23 A. 553 (1892), which involved a direction to pay sur•
plus income to satisfy liens on real estate and in which a surplus remained after the
satisfaction of this purpose.
242, 109 Conn. 7, 144 A. 659 (1929).
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paid to her children immediately, excluding a reserve fund sufficient
to provide for the payment of the continuing annuities.
The Connecticut court dealt with this problem again in New
Haven Bank v. Hubinger. 243 There was no residuary gift, and upon
the death of the last surviving life annuitant the trust corpus was
given to the then living issue of the testator's son and daughter.
Again the surplus income was held to go by intestacy. The court
here followed a constructional preference against an inferred intention to accumulate income, aided by an inference that the failure to
dispose of all of the income was inadvertent. It said that surplus
income would go to residuary legatees, if any, unless their gifts were
contingent, in which event such surplus would go by intestacy. The
gifts here being contingent, the remaindermen were not entitled
to the surplus income; moreover, the court stated, the will gave
them only "the principal."
The problem in these cases is the same as that discussed above in
connection with gaps in income interests.244 If a court resists the
accumulation of income, either because of concern about its duration
or for more general reasons, trouble is encountered in the immediate
distribution of accruing surplus income where no disposition appears other than contingent or defeasible gifts of corpus or residue.
In the last two of the three cases discussed above, if the court had
accepted the notion that income not otherwise disposed of accrues
to corpus (especially when the corpus is given by a residuary clause),
and had also escaped the traditional prejudice against the accumulation of income, the surplus income could simply have been held for
the benefit of those who ultimately became entitled to the corpus. In
Shephard, where such an accumulation might have exceeded the
permissible period, the court could have used the alternative and
perhaps preferable solutions suggested earlier.245
In similar circumstances, where the corpus was given upon the
death of two living persons, a New Jersey court assumed without
discussion that the surplus income was intestate property, but held
that it should be accumulated and distributed ·with the corpus.246
The argument made in Shephard. that surplus income cannot be
given to the takers of corpus when the instrument gives them only
the "principal" was applied in two cases to give such income to
243. 117 Conn. 417, 167 A. 914 (1933).
244. See section IIC supra.
245. See text accompanying note 158 supra.
246. Swetland v. Swetland, 100 N.J. Eq. 196, 134 A. 822 (Ch. 1926) affd. on other
grounds, 102 N.J. Eq. 294, 140 A. 279 (CL Err. 8: App. 1928).
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residuary legatees.247 Where there is no residuary gift, however,
and the gifts of corpus are neither contingent nor defeasible, there is
little excuse for producing an intestacy by such a construction.

Annuities
There are several problems in the construction of language that
courts have classified by reference to the term "annuity." It is evident
from the courts' use of the label that it does not have the same
meaning for all purposes and that all courts do not use the same
meaning. The usual danger of the misuse of labels in deciding cases
is especially evident here.
At a minimum, an annuity is a right "to receive fixed, periodical
payments, either for life or a number of years." 248 One might even
eliminate from the definition any time limitation, for a perpetual
annuity is at least a theoretical possibility. At any rate, an annuity is
not necessarily a life interest, although on occasion it is so treated.240
While an annuity is commonly thought of as a contract with an in•
surance company, there is no reason to limit the term to that method
of creation, for it can usefully be applied to interests created by will
or by other donative transactions. Moreover, the commercial annuity
can result from wills directing a fiduciary to purchase an annuity for
a designated beneficiary.
Such a disposition may raise the question whether the beneficiary
may elect to take the sum designated for the purchase of the annuity
rather than the annuity itself. It is necessary to distinguish this type
of disposition from one in which a trustee is directed to make
periodic payments of trust income or principal or to set aside a sum
sufficient to produce periodically a designated sum. It is clear that in
the latter instances a beneficiary has no right to elect to take the commuted value of his annuity,250 although there may be circumstances in which a court will order such commutation in the interest
of all the beneficiaries.251
Where the dispositive direction is to purchase an annuity the
English courts have sustained the annuitant's right of election, even
against the express intention of the donor, on the ground that as soon
G.

247. Welch v. Hill, 218 Mass. 327, 105 N.E. 1067 (1914): In re Estate of Vanderbilt,
229 App. Div. 574, 243 N.Y.S. 165 (1930). Cf, In re Kohler, 231 N.Y. 353, 132 N.E. 114
(1921).
248. Dwight Estate, 389 Pa. 520, 525, 134 A.2d 45, 48 (1957).
249. Estate of Hoyt, 275 Wis. 484, 82 N.W.2d 1'77 (1957).
250. In re Will of Maybaum, 296 N.Y. 201, '71 N.E.2d 865 (194'7): In re Harris' Will,
143 N.Y.S.2d 746 (Sur. Ct. 1955).
251. In re Ferris, 3 N.Y.2d '70, 143 N.E.2d 505 (195'7).
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as the annuity is acquired it may be sold by the annuitant. 252 The
same rule was accepted in Massachusetts253 and, until changed by
statute,254 in New York.255 While such a rule is consistent with the
English law on trust termination, in this country its application
would violate the Claflin doctrine if a settlor intended to prevent
the annuitant from having immediate management and enjoyment
of the capital fund. More recently, courts in other states have cited
the Claflin doctrine in denying the right of election.256 The right has
also been denied where trustees were given a discretion to sell
property, using the proceeds for the purchase of annuities,257 and
where the testator intended to benefit the institution from which
the annuity was to be purchased.258
A New York statute making inalienable the "right of a beneficiary
of an express trust to receive the income from property and apply
it to the use of or pay it to any person"259 has been held inapplicable
to annuities,260 where "annuity" refers to rights to payments out of
principal as well as income. The assignment of remainder interests
to such a beneficiary has been held to permit termination of a trust
and payment to him of the balance of the trust fund. 261 Such termination has been denied, however, upon the authority of the statute,
where a trustee was directed to pay a beneficiary sixty dollars a month
out of income, with power in the trustee's discretion to use principal
for this purpose and to increase the payments if he believed either
was necessary for the beneficiary's support.262 An annuity for such a
purpose does not, for New York perpetuity purposes, suspend the
power of alienation,268 because the annuity is not made inalienable
by the statute.
252. 4 A. Scorr, supra note 1, § 346.
253. Parker v. Cabe, 208 Mass. 260, 94 N.E. 476 (1911).
254. N.Y. EsrATES, POWERS &: TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.9 (McKinney 1967).
255. In re Estate of Cole, 219 N.Y. 435, 114 N.E. 785 (1916).
256. In re Estate of Johnson, 238 Iowa 1221, 30 N.W.2d 164 (1947); Bedell v. Colby,
94 N.Y. 384, 54 A.2d 161 (1947). Cf. Feiler v. Feiler, 149 Ohio St. 17, 77 N.E.2d 237
(1948), in which the court disapproved of the English rule, but decided the case on
the ground that such a rule was not applicable on the facts of the case.
257. Feiler v. Feiler, 149 Ohio St. 17, 77 N.E.2d 237 (1948).
258. American Bible Soc. v. Chase, 340 Ill. App. 548, 92 N.E.2d 332 (1950).
259. N.Y. EsrATES, POWERS &: TRusrs I.Aw § 7-I.5(a)(l) (McKinney 1967).
260. Wells v. Squires, 117 App. Div. 502, 102 N.Y.S. 597 (1907), afjd. mem., 191
N.Y. 529, 84 N.E. 1122 (1908); In re Estate of Fowler, 263 App. Div. 255, 32 N.Y.S.2d
700, affd. mem., 288 N.Y. 697, 43 N.E.2d 87 (1942).
261. In re Schirmer's Will, 113 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sur. Ct. 1952).
262. In re Higgins' Will, 205 Misc. 385, 127 N.Y.S.2d 664 (Sur. Ct. 1954).
263. In re Trumble, 199 N.Y. 454, 92 N.E. 1073 (1910); Wells v. Squires, 117 App.
Div. 502, 102 N.Y.S. 597 (1907), affd, mem., 191 N.Y. 529, 84 N.E. 1122 (1908); In re
Kerb's Estate, 130 N.Y.S.2d 259 (Sur Ct. 1954).

1574

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. '72:1507

A restricted meaning of "annuity," similar to that used in the
New York cases noted above, appears in cases involving the question
whether an annuity is payable only out of trust income. While this
Article does not undertake a general consideration of the language
necessary to confer a power to invade trust corpus, that issue is
implicit in testamentary gifts of annuities where the source of payment is not expressed. The absence of language limiting the payments to trust income seems to justify an inference that any part of
the trust estate not otherwise restricted is available to meet the directed payments. It is usually held in such cases that corpus may be
taken where the available income is insufficient.264 In reaching this
result courts often apply the term "annuity" to distinguish the disposition from a bequest of trust income. This restricted meaning of
"annuity" can be misleading, for in a larger sense both types of gifts
are annuities.265
Where the case concerns the power to use corpus for the payment
of an annuity, the decision may turn on a variety of factors other than
the specific language of the gift, including the relation between the
settlor and the annuitant and the relative size of the annuity and the
trust estate. This issue has in fact been raised in cases in which the
language expressly directed the payment out of income. Although
the courts in such cases have usually denied access to corpus,200 the
language of some courts implies that even this specific limitation does
not necessarily preclude a resort to corpus.267
Confusion concerning the meaning of "annuity" is further generated by statutes such as section 161(3) of the California Probate
Code. While purporting to classify legacies in the usual manner,
that provision defines "annuity" as "a bequest of certain specified
sums periodically; if the fund or property out of which a demonstra264. Estate of Luck.el, 151 Cal. App. 2d 481, 312 P.2d 24 (2d Dist. 1957): Schoesscr
v. Schoesser, 329 III. App. 604, 70 N.E.2d 346 (1946): D'Evercaux Hall Orphan Asylum
v. Green, 226 S.2d 725 (Miss. 1969): 2 A. Scorr, supra note 1, § 128.7 n.18. But see id.
§ 128.7 n.1'7: Annot., 109 A.L.R. 717 (1937).
265. This distinction should not be confused with the distinction between a direction
to an executor or a trustee to purchase an annuity and a direction to a trustee to make
periodic payments to a trust beneficiary. In the larger sense both of these are also
annuities, and both may also be annuities in the sense that trust corpus is committed,
266. Estate of Markham v. Palmer, 28 Cal. 2d 69, 168 P.2d 669 (1946); Dwight Estate,
389 Pa. 520, 134 A.2d 45 (1957): Elmore Estate, 379 Pa. 155, 108 A.2d 803 (1954),
267. See especially Dwight Estate, 389 Pa. 520, 134 A.2d 45 (1957). In such cir•
cumstances special care is required to avoid confusion over the meaning of "annuity."
In one case, in which the will directed the payment of annuities out of income and
the testator referred to such gifts as "annuities," the court relied on the reference to
hold that corpus could be reached to make up past failures to meet the annuity
payments. MacMackin Estate, 356 Pa. 189, 51 A,2d 689 (1947),
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tive legacy or an annuity is payable fails, in whole or in part, resort
may be had to the general assets, as in the case of a general legacy."268
The provision, if read literally, permits resort to corpus even if
an annuity is expressly payable only out of trust income. It appears,
however, that the California courts have escaped such a result by
distinguishing between an annuity and a gift of trust income.269 In
other words, if an annuity is payable out of trust income it is not
an annuity within the meaning of the Code provision.
When an executor or a trustee is directed to set aside a sum
sufficient to produce an annuity in a stated amount, it is obvious that
a given sum may at times fail to produce that amount. While different results have been reached as to whether the annuitant is
entitled to have the fund increased from the residue of the settlor's
estate,270 there is authority that the annuitant is at least entitled to
have the deficiency made up from the principal of the fund set aside
to produce the annuity.271

III. CONCLUSION
Dispositive gaps in income interests usually result from a failure
to perceive all of the circumstances that may arise rather than from
inept efforts to provide for them. The construction problems discussed above emphasize the magnitude of the problem of avoiding
such gaps. Of equal concern is the inclination of some courts to discover and fill dispositive gaps that by proper construction do not
exist. A dispositive gap may be discovered by a court in assuming
either that an income interest can be only a life interest or that it
was so intended in a particular case, even where the interest is not
expressly so limited. This assumption is pervasive; some might even
suggest a statutory provision that all income interests are life interests, as provided in the Louisiana Trust Code,272 or that they
should be presumed to be so limited. The first suggestion is an indefensible stricture upon dispositive freedom, and the second would in
some degree produce the same sort of confusion that would follow
an effort to reestablish the old precept that any estate is for life
268. CAL. PROB. CoDE § 161(3) (West 1956). Similar statutes can be found in Montana,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. See 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 1, § 128.7 n.22.
269. See Estate of Markham v. Palmer, 28 Cal. 2d 69, 168 P.2d 669 (1946); Estate of
Luckel, 151 Cal. App. 2d 481,312 P.2d 24 (2d Dist. 195'7).
270. See In re Doerschuck's Will, 79 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sur. Ct. 1948) (holding against the
annuitant's claim)~ 2 A. SCOTT, supra note 1, § 128.7 n.22.
271. In re Von Miklos, 11 Misc. 2d 939, 170 N.Y.S.2d 405 (Sur. Ct. 195'7); 2 A. ScoTT,
supra note 1, § 128.7 n.23. But cf. In re Doerschuck.'s Will, 79 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sur. Ct. 1948).
272. See note 84 supra.
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unless it is conveyed with words of inheritance. It would, moreover,
increase the number of real dispositive gaps, thus increasing judicial
implication of interests to fill them.
I have presumed to advance a proposal for dealing with real dispositive gaps in income interests: Trust income belongs to those who
are entitled to trust corpus, unless such income is specifically given
to others. Although this idea is not novel, it has seldom been advanced
as a general constructional precept. Its acceptance would require a
considerable shift in courts' attitudes about the accumulation of income.
I believe that property 01vners should be encouraged to give
their property outright. The creation of present and future interests
in trust are permitted, within policy limits, in order to serve worthy
purposes. While our law is not designed to discourage elaborate
trust arrangements-indeed, the federal tax laws encourage themit is sound social and economic policy to leave as much control of
property as possible in the hands of the living. If one does not wish
to leave property outright, he should be encouraged to give it with
as few restrictions as possible. Thus if one wants merely to gain
the advantages of trust administration, he should not have to create
an elaborate scheme of present and future interests or powers of
appointment. Because of prevailing drafting terminology, it has
become very difficult to establish such a scheme with security, simplicity, and clarity. The problem, like the income problems, is
aggravated by conceptual confusion over the nature of equitable interests in trust as they operate within the doctrine of estates. I know
of no simple solution. Too many draftsmen have addressed it with
only a dim perception of what they were trying to do. The problem
must be carefully identified and analyzed; it will then yield to careful
drafting.

